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ARTICLES
ANTITRUST INTENT
RONALD A. CASS* & KEITH N. HYLTONt

I. INTRODUCTION
Many legal rules turn on a party's state of mind--or intent-with

respect to some action or consequence. Legal scholars and jurists have
debated both the contours of such requirements and the proof required for
1

them.
In recent years, intent has been an especially controversial issue in
antitrust law.

Although the controversy touches both the conspiracy

* Dean and Melville Madison Bigelow Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law
Senior Fellow, International Centre for Economic Research.
t Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
0 2001 Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton. The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial
and administrative support provided by Boston University, the International Centre for Economic
Research, and Microsoft Corporation. We thank participants in faculty workshops at Boston
University, Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, and the University of San Diego
Law School for helpful suggestions. We also thank Joe Brodley. Vic Khanna, Susan Koniak. Eric
Rasmusen, and Ken Simons for helpful comments, and Brian Kaiser, Alissa Kaplan, Pete Rinato,
Seema Srinivasan, and Russell Sweet for research assistance. Each coauthor blames the other for any
remaining errors.
1. See, e.g., V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault a Faults, Notion?: The Case of
CorporateMens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355 (1999); Richard J. Lazarus, Mens Rea in Environmental

Criminal Law: Reading Supreme Court Tea Leaves, 7 FORDHA ENvF L.J. 861 (1996): Michael S.
Moore, Causation and Excuses, 73 CAL. L REV. 1091 (1985); Jeffrey S. Parker. The Economics of
Mens Rea, 79 VA. L. REv. 741 (1993); Paul H. Robinson, A BriefHistory of Distinctionsin Criminal
Culpability, 31 HASnI'Gs L.J. 815 (1980); Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L REV. 974
(1932); Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L REv. 463 (1992); John Shepard
Wfiley, Jr., Not Guilty By Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in FederalCriminal Interpretation,85
VA. L. REV. 1021 (1999). For perhaps the earliest treatment of the intent issue in the context of
antitrust law, see Alfred E. Kahn, Standardsof Antitrust Policy, 67 HARV. L REV. 28. 48-54 (1953)
(discussing role of intent examination in rule-of-reason analysis).

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:657

(section 1) and monopolization (section 2) provisions of the Sherman Act,
the bulk of the controversy involves monopolization cases. Some scholars
have urged courts to try to discover the monopolist's subjective intent by
examining internal corporate memoranda and comments by officers of the
firm.2
Others have argued that intent should play no role in
monopolization cases.3 In a famous attempt to eliminate the intent inquiry
from monopoly case law, Judge Hand declared in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa) that "no monopolist monopolizes
4
unconscious of what he is doing."
This Article provides a theory of legal standards that explains and
justifies the role of intent analysis in antitrust law. We argue that the
structure of many legal rules can be understood by focusing on the goal of
minimizing the costs from legal errors. Although we focus on antitrust
law, the methodology presented here is applicable to other areas of the law.
Our theory rejects the two extreme normative positions on the role of
intent: the view that intent should play no role in legal analysis, and the
view that intent should be determined for most purposes in antitrust law by
a subjective inquiry. Our theory supports intent standards for antitrust
quite similar to the doctrines courts are actually applying.
The argument proceeds in two steps. First, we identify the legal
standards applied in the antitrust case law. Second, we present a theory
that explains the standards.
As a general proposition, the case law suggests that plaintiffs must
meet a higher burden with respect to the defendant's intent under section 2
of the Sherman Act than is typically required under section 1. Under
section 1, plaintiffs must demonstrate only that the defendant intended to
2. See, e.g., 63 Transcript of Trial, Further Direct Examination of Franklin M. Fisher, June 1,
1999 (p.m. session), at 62-67, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) (Nos.
98-1232, 98-1233), available at http.lwww.microsoft.com/presspass/trialltranscripts/jun99/06-01pm.asp [hereinafter Fisher Direct]; 65 Transcript of Trial, Cross Examination of Franklin M. Fisher,
June 3, 1999 (a.m. session), at 33-34, available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/triall
transcriptsjun99/06-03-am.asp; Daniel J.Gifford, The Role of the Ninth Circuit in the Development of
the Law of Attempt to Monopolize, 61 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1021, 1021-23 (1986) (arguing that
specific-intent evidence resolves ambiguities surrounding defendant's conduct).
3. See, e.g., FRANKLIN M. FISHER, JOHN J. McGOWAN & JOEN E. GREENWOOD, FOLDED,
SPINDLED, AND MUTLATED: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND U.S. V.IBM 272 (1983); Steven C. Salop & R.
Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 617, 652 (1999).
4. 148 F.2d 416,432 (2d Cir. 1945).
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engage in the conduct (conspiracy) that is asserted to violate the law.5
Under section 2, plaintiffs must produce evidence that is consistent with a
specific intent to monopolize-that the overwhelming, perhaps the sole,
purpose of the defendant's conduct was to reduce competition. The section
2 specific-intent standard constrains courts from penalizing a dominant
firm when its conduct involves a mixture of potentially proconsumer and
competition-restricting actions. This standard, we vill show, minimizes
the costs of error in applying section 2.
Our definition of the term speciftc intent is not synonymous with
subjective intent, although the two are frequently used as synonyms both in
antitrust law and in other fields. 6 A "subjective intent" standard requires
the plaintiff to produce evidence of the defendant's actual state of mind. In
contrast, we use specific intent here to describe an inquiry conducted on the
basis of objective evidence. Rather than asking for direct evidence of what
the defendant had in mind, the objective approach asks what state of mind
can reasonably be attributed to the defendant in light of his actions. Our
framework yields the result that this objective specific-intent standard,
which generally is used in section 2 cases, is the proper standard under
section 2.
We examine the Microsoftcase7 under the lens of our framework, as a
concrete study of the function of intent rules in antitrust. Some scholars
have argued that in high-technology markets, where consumers face
substantial costs in switching from a dominant product, courts should focus
solely on the effects of the dominant firm's conduct, weighing in each case
consumer benefits against competitive harms. They reason that benign
intent should not excuse firms in high-technology markets, where "network
effects" (additional market power that results from consumers being locked
in to the dominant product) heighten barriers to competition.s Others have
suggested that subjective-intent evidence is especially relevant in this
setting, and can be used to support liability for what might otherwise be
5. In some instances (such as an agreement to fix prices) proof of conduct that violates the law
very strongly suggests an intent that is antithetical to ordinary competition. Separate proof of such an
intent, however, is not required. See infra Part ILB.
6. In criminal law, for example, "specific intent" typically refers to what we call "subjective
intent." See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRBIINAL LAW § 10.04, at 105-06 (2d ed.
1995); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScOTT, JR., CRZIINAL LANW
§ 3.5, at 216-27 (2d ed. 1986).
7. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1998-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 172,261 (D.D.C. 1998) (order
granting summary judgment on monopoly leveraging claim under section 2). See also United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (findings of fact); United States v. Microsoft Corp, 87
F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (conclusions of law). As this Article went to press, the district court's
decision was being reviewed by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.
8. See Salop & Romaine, supranote 3. at 651-65.
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considered benign activity, again because of concern over restrictive
barriers to competition. 9 We reject both of these claims. We conclude that
the existence of network effects tilts the case further in favor of the
specific-intent requirement, properly understood as an objective inquiry.
The error-cost approach to legal standards illuminates the reason that
intent standards are used in tort law, criminal law, constitutional law, and
elsewhere. Economic analyses of law have tended to ignore intent
doctrines, focusing on rules framed in terms of the actor's conduct. Our
framework extends the economic analysis of legal rules by providing a
theory of the function of intent doctrines generally. So far as courts are
free to tailor intent standards, they gravitate toward standards that minimize
the expected cost of legal errors. While we do not argue that judge-made
law invariably advances social welfare,' ° we do find that judicially crafted
legal standards respecting intent generally coincide with this objective.
Part II sets out a framework for legal rules that defines and
distinguishes "conduct" and "intent" standards, then applies that framework
to show how the key doctrinal rules in antitrust can be broken down into
conduct- and intent-based components. Part III develops the error-cost
analysis of legal rules and uses it to provide a positive theory of intent
standards in the common law. In the latter portion of Part III, we apply our
theory of intent standards to antitrust law. Part IV applies the error-cost
framework developed in Part III to the issues generated by the Microsoft
litigation. Part V extends our theory of intent standards to explain
functionally similar rules in corporate, tort, and constitutional law.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS IN ANTITRUST LAW
A. A TYPOLOGY OF LEGAL STANDARDS
A legal standardsets forth the facts or conditions that must be proven
or implied by the evidence in order for the plaintiff to prevail. Legal
standards-or more accurately, components of such standards-can be
separated into two broad categories.
9.
10.

E.g., Fisher Direct, supra note 2, at 62-67.
Many commentators advance this position. See, e.g., John C. Goodman, An Economic

Theory of the Evolution of Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978); William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979); George L. Priest, The
Common Lav Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin,
Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977).
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The first type of legal standard, the conduct standard, describes the

sort of conduct that must be demonstrated in order for the plaintiff to
prevail. The best-known conduct standard in antitrust law is the rule of
reason (or reasonableness)test, which requires the plaintiff to prove that
the competitive harms from the defendant's conduct outweigh any benefits

to consumers from that conduct. The reasonableness test in antitrust law,
like the negligence test in tort law, rests on a balancing of the social costs
1
and benefits of the defendant's actions. '

The other major conduct standard observed in antitrust law, the per se
rule, does not ask decisionmakers to balance social costs and benefits."2
Under the rule of per se illegality for price-fixing, the defendant who

participates in a cartel will be found in violation of the Sherman Act
13
whether or not the violative conduct could be deemed reasonable.
The second type of legal standard, an intent standard, requires
evidence of the defendant's state of mind. There are two intent standards

in antitrust. Some claims require proof merely of the intent to carry out the
conduct set forth in the complaint; these claims fall under a general-intent

standard. These claims require only that the defendant be cognizant of
taking a particular action, not purposeful of bringing about a particular
(undesirable) result. 14 Other claims are adjudicated under a specific-intent
standard, requiring the plaintiff to prove that the defendant intended to
11. One question is whether the proper objective is the maximization of consumer welfare or
total welfare (the sum of consumer and producer welfare). The two come into conflict in the case of a
"welfare tradeoff," such as the case of a merger that reduces production costs and at the same time
generates sufficient market power for the merged firm to raise its price. A consumer welfare objective
would hold all such cases undesirable. A total welfare standard might approve such a merger, provided
that the efficiency gains outweigh the net loss in consumer welfare. For the case for using the total
welfare standard in merger analysis, see Oliver B. \Williamson, Economiesas an AntitrustDefense: The
Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 A. EcoN. REv. 18 (1969). Different constructions of the normative goal for
antitrust can be important in many contexts. See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley. The Economic Goals of
Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and TecimologicalProgress,62 N.Y.U. L REv. 1020 (1987).
For the most part, however, our intent analysis is unaffected by the specific antitrust maximand.
12. Courts have argued, in some cases, that this task (of balancing costs and benefits) has been
performed already in framing the per se rule. For example, in United States r. Trenton PotteriesCo.,
the Supreme Court suggested that because the burdens of weighing the costs and benefits of price-fixing
on a case-by-case basis were too high, given that price-fixing is socially harmful in most cases, a pr se
prohibition was justified. 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927).
13. E.g., id at 398 ("[U]niform price-fixing by those controlling in any substantial manner a
trade or business in interstate commerce is prohibited by the Sherman Law, despite the reasonableness

of the particular prices agreed upon.").
14. In some instances, a mistake of fact can preclude formation of the general intent necessary
for criminal or civil liability. The intent needed for liability, however, is not eliminated byall mistaken
beliefs. On the meaning of general intent in the criminal law, see, for example, DRESSLER, supra note
6, § 10.06, at 118-20 and LAFAVE & Scowr, supra note 6, § 3.5(e), at 223-25.
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harm competition. As discussed below, intent standards in antitrust are part
15
of a larger group of intent standards in the law.
Legal standards in antitrust and the common law should be viewed as
combinations of conduct and intent standards. Consider again the per se
rule, making those who engage in price-fixing conspiracies liable for

violating the Sherman Act whether or not they can prove that their actions
were economically reasonable. The per se rule is a combination of a per se

conduct standard, since reasonableness of conduct is irrelevant under it,
and an intent standard that requires proof only of general intent-that is,
16
the intent to take part in a conspiracy.

This typology of legal standards corresponds to the tests observed in
the common law. Consider three examples from tort law: the negligence
rule, the legal standard for trespass, and the cause of action for assault. The
negligence rule includes a conduct standard that requires proof that the
defendant's conduct is unreasonable-that is, the cost of avoiding
foreseeable harm is less than the expected harm.' 7 Since there is no need to
prove specific intent in order to win a negligence suit, negligence requires

no more than evidence indicating general intent.18 Trespass doctrine is
similar to negligence in its intent component but not in its conduct
component-it requires only proof that the defendant intended the conduct,
15. In Parts III and V we discuss intent standards and functionally similar rules in several other
areas of the law. The general-intent standard is similar to the standard, used in many areas of the law,
that action be volitional. It can, however, impose serious burdens on antitrust plaintiffs, depending on
the nature of the conduct to which it is applied. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. The specific-intent
standard discussed in this Article is more limited than the series of differentiated standards used in other
areas. Criminal law, for example, contains specific-intent requirements that include the intention to
bring about particular harmful consequences, the knowledge that an action almost certainly will have
particular harmful consequences, and reckless disregard for the prospect that an action will have such
harmful consequences. See generally DRESSLER, supranote 6, § 10.04, at 105-16.
16. The intent standard here is general rather than specific because what is required for liability
is simply the intent to engage in the conduct that violates the law, not to engage in that conduct for a
particular reason or with particular knowledge (e.g., to harm the victim). In conspiracy law, the conduct
is, of course, agreement to do something. Agreement requires a certain mental state with respect to
completion of the agreed-upon conduct-an expectation on at least one party's part that it will bring
about the agreed conduct. This does not, however, make the necessary intent required here rise to
specific, rather than general, intent. See discussion infra note 35.
17. The negligence standard holds the defendant liable if he fails to take care when the burden of
taking care is less than the expected incremental losses. This standard is often referred to as the Hand
formula, since Judge Learned Hand was the first to state it explicitly in a court opinion. See United
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
18. An action will not be found negligent if it is not volitional. So, for example, someone who
injures another during an epileptic seizure will not be liable in negligence for the injuries unless,
knowing of his condition, he voluntarily put himself in a position where the injuries were likely to
occur. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 29, at 162 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds.,
5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
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not proof of unreasonable conduct or of a particular state of mind with
respect to purpose or consequences.'

9

In this sense, the trespass rule is a

combination of a strict (or per se) liability rule and a general-intent
standard.2 0 The legal standard for assault provides an example of a rule

combining a reasonable conduct standard and a specific-intent requirement.
In an assault action, the plaintiff presents evidence indicating unreasonable

conduct (the assault) and specific intent to cause harm.2 '
Although this framework suggests four potential legal standards (see
Figure 1), we see only three in antitrust and the common law generally:

strict or per se liability coupled with general intent, reasonableness coupled
with general intent, and reasonableness coupled with specific intent. The
per se rule of antitrust and the trespass doctrine of tort law are legal
standards that combine a per se conduct rule with a general-intent standard.

In both cases, courts refuse to inquire into the reasonableness of conduct,
and the plaintiff is not required to present evidence showing specific intent
to harm. The negligence rule in tort law and the rule of reason test in

antitrust both combine a reasonable conduct test with a general-intent
standard. The standard governing liability for assault (and also that for
punitive damages)22 is a reasonable conduct test combined with a specificintent standard. The missing standard-combining per se liability with
specific intent respecting the conduct at the core of the action-is an

unlikely combination because it would declare conduct punishable without
any consideration of offsetting benefits, but then resist liability unless the

defendant engaged in the conduct with a particular purpose or intended
consequence. 23
19. Id. § 13, at 73.
20. A reasonable mistake, e.g., a belief that you were walking on your own proptrty or on
property belonging to someone who had consented to your presence, will not defeat liability for
trespass. However, absence of any intent to take the actions necessary to trespass, e.g., sleep-walking,
would preclude the requisite general intent. Id.
21. The Restatement defines liability for assault as folloxvs:
An actor is subject to liability to another for assault if (a) he acts intending to cause a
harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent
apprehension of such a contact, and (b) the other is thereby put in such imminent
apprehension.
RESTATEMNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21(1) (1965). Assault can be established without intent to harm.
but recovery for such technical or innocent assaults is limited to nominal damages. See id. § 10. at 43.
22. See id. § 2, at 9-10 (discussing specific-intent requirement for punitive damages). The intent
requirement for punitive damages is not limited to actual subjective intent to harm, encompassing as
well evidence consistent with knowledge of likely harm or reckless indifference to its likelihood. We
return below to the explanation of specific intent as a basis for increased penalties. See discussion infra
Part IILB.4.
23. We recognize, of course, that reasonable conduct can fall within the ambit of a per se rule.
Obviously, that is the critical distinction between a per se rule and a rule of reason. But per se rules do
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Reasonable
Conduct Test

Strict
Conduct Test

General
Intent

Negligence test
Rule of reason

Trespass rule
Price-fixing rule

Specific
Intent

Assault rule
Punitive damages rule
Figure 1

Although a specific intent to cause harm increases the likelihood of
harm, and is associated with a lower social value for the harmful act,2 4 this
does not imply a need for evidence of an individual's subjective intent.
Under traditional tort doctrines, where specific intent is a necessary
element of the tort, the intent is typically inferred from the defendant's
actions. Without any testimony about what a defendant says he intended,
courts routinely infer the specific intent to produce harmful consequences
in settings where the probable harms are substantial, probable, and highly
foreseeable, and the cost of harm avoidance is small.25
In some areas, the common law does look at evidence of subjective
intent. For example, criminal law sanctions often turn on such evidencedid the defendant, Henry, intend to kill George or merely to frighten
George when he fired the gun in George's direction? Without evidence of
Henry's actual state of mind, we cannot be certain of the character of
not burden classes of conduct viewed as reasonable in the main. In that light, consider the decision that
a shipowner in distress is liable for trespass to the dock owner whose property provides needed refuge.
Even though seeking refuge in a storm is reasonable, the class of activity that encompasses it-making
use of the property of another person when you think it appropriate rather than when the owner has
consented-is not. See Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).
24. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the CriminalLaw, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193,
1196-98 (1985) (arguing that destructive acts and coercive wealth transfers are inefficient because they
create social costs that are not offset by social benefits).
25. See, e.g., Allen v. Hannaford, 244 P. 700, 701 (Wash. 1926) (holding that despite the
defendant's claim that the gun was unloaded, and that she therefore could not have had an intent to
harm, the defendant was liable for assault). See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, § 10, at
46 (discussing intent requirement for assault, noting that it is sufficient that the defendant's conduct
intentionally produces an apprehension of immediate harm).
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Henry's action.2 6 But this explanation only serves partly to justify the use

of subjective-intent evidence. In addition to knowing what such evidence
adds to the evaluation of conduct, one also needs to know the costs of

obtaining and using it.27 For now, it is enough to note that the costs and
benefits associated with subjective-intent evidence vary depending on the
area of law and the degree to which legal standards rely upon it. Indeed,
the absence of a fourth cell in Figure 1 suggests that intent analysis,
objective or subjective, plays a largely subsidiary role in the common law.
The final piece of the legal standards puzzle is the selection of
standards of proof. The legal standard itself sets forth facts or conditions

that must be proven, while the standard of proof establishes the degree of
certainty that must be met in order to satisfy a decisionmaker that the legal
standard is met. A preponderance of the evidence standard, for example,
requires the plaintiff to show that it is more probable than not that the
defendant violated the legal standard.

It follows from this that the

"effective legal standard" can be thought of as the product of the conduct
standard, the intent standard, and the standard of proof. The most stringent

legal standard (unreasonable conduct combined with specific intent)
coupled with the highest proof burden (beyond a reasonable doubt) places
the highest effective legal hurdle before the plaintiff. Our analysis below is

an attempt to understand the legal standards in antitrust, but it has
implications for standards outside of antitrust and the allocation of proof
burdens as well.
26. On the role of intent in the punishment of attempts, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRmuNAL LAw 115-22 (1978); Lawrence Crocker, Justice in Criminal Lability: Decriminalizing
HarmlessAttempts, 53 OHIo ST. LJ.1057 (1992). The "subjectivist" theory that the defendant's intent
is the controlling factor in the punishment of attempts (and offensive conduct generally) is attributed to
John Austin. See 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 142-52 (Burt Franklin ed., 1970)
(1861). The explanation in the text is phrased in terms of deterrence (or some other consequentialist
end) as the goal for criminal law. That explanation fits our own priors as well as the contours of the
law, but it is by no means essential to the requirement of subjective-intent evidence in settings such as
this. Jurists and commentators who embrace retributive or other nonconsequentialist goals also find
state-of-mind evidence essential to gauge appropriate punishment in settings where the level of risk is
ambiguous. Indeed, retributivist theorists, from Austin forward, have been the most vocal proponts
of the subjectivist approach to punishment. For a recent statement of the retributivist view, see Sanford
I. Kadish, Foreward: The Criminal Lanv and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY
679,688-95 (1994).
27. We address these issues infra Part ILLB.
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B. SECTION 1 LEGAL STANDARDS

Ever since the Supreme Court's decision in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States,2 8 it has been clear that the reasonableness standard applies as the
default conduct rule in section 1 cases. Courts generally have not focused
separately on the intent standard for section 1 cases. But, even without
isolating that aspect of the legal standard for section 1 liability, courts have
made the default standard for intent in these cases fairly clear.
In the first Supreme Court case specifically to address the intent issue,
Nash v. United States, the Court rejected the claim that proof of a specific
intent to restrain trade or to harm competition was required before a
defendant could be found to have violated the Sherman Act.29 The
defendant in Nash argued that the rule of reason test (which had recently
been adopted by the Court in Standard Oil) was unconstitutionally vague as
a criminal standard because no one could know with certainty what a court
would conclude constituted reasonable conduct. 30 One possible response
would have been to require a specific intent to violate the law, a route taken
by the Court to cure vagueness problems with other statutes. 31 The Court,
through Justice Holmes, rejected this approach, declaring that the
vagueness problem was of little concern as the law is "full of instances
where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly ...some matter of
32
degree."
28.
29.

221 U.S. 1 (1911).
229 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1913).

30. Id. at 376-77.
31. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 (1945). The Court also later read a
specific-intent requirement into the Sherman Act for criminal liability. See United States v. Gypsum
Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436-47 (1978). Nash, however, continues to define the standard for application of
antitrust law in civil suits.
32. Nash, 229 U.S. at 377. Holmes supported his assertion with a few examples:
If a man should kill another by driving an automobile furiously into a crowd he might be
convicted of murder however little he expected the result. If he did no more than drive
negligently through a street he might get off with manslaughter or less. And in the last case
he might be held although he himself thought that he was acting as a prudent man should.
Id. (citations omitted).
Although the law now requires proof of specific intent in criminal antitrust actions, see Gypsum,
438 U.S. 422, there was considerable merit in the defendant's position when Nash was decided. The
rule-of-reason standard in antitrust is essentially a cost-benefit test, like the negligence standard in tort
law. Courts have had no trouble accepting the position that a defendant can be civilly liable for
negligence while failing to have the level of intent required under the criminal law. In other words, it is
understood that fair-minded individuals-those who do not possess a criminal intent-may make
incorrect decisions and fail to do what a reasonable person would do. Violation of a criminal standard
traditionally requires a specific intent to cause a particular harm.
Perhaps that is why Holmes' opinion in Nash was characteristically brief and uncharacteristically
unpersuasive. Holmes did not have an easy task in justifying the reasonableness standard along with a
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While the Standard Oil and Nash decisions made the rule of reason
the default legal standard-with reasonableness as the default conduct rule

and general intent as the default intent rule-under section 1, the Supreme
Court identified a class of price-fixing cases as exceptional. Much of the

case law over the past seventy-five years has focused on locating the
boundaries between the reasonable and per se conduct rules and between
the cases where general intent will suffice and those where specific intent is

required.
1. DirectPrice-Fixing

In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., the Supreme Court held
that an agreement to fix prices is per se illegal. 33 Under the rule laid down
in Socony, price-fixing is illegal even if the defendants do not have the
power to carry out their price-fixing conspiracy. 34 The level of intent that

must be shown under this rule corresponds to the general-intent
requirement of tort law: an intent simply to perform the conduct that
violates the law, not to inflict some particular harm. Thus, what plaintiffs
must show is evidence that the defendants intended to make and carry out a

price-fixing plan, not necessarily to make monopoly profits from pricefixing or to achieve some other purpose? 5 Even if the defendants
comprised too small a share of the market to have a significant impact on
general-intent standard as a basis for criminal conduct. Section 1 is the result of Congress' effort to
criminalize conduct that traditionally had been addressed by contract law--specifically, the law
governing contracts in restraint of trade. The standard approach in restraint-of-trde doctrine was a
reasonableness standard combined with a general-intent standard. On the common law of trade
restraints, see, for example, DONALD DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND L,%W 123-38 (1959).
Applying that legal standard to a criminal statute, however, necessarily raised notice and vagueness
issues. None of the available alternatives, however, would have (a) adhered to Congress' direction, (b)
made sense, and (c) avoided questions about overreaching in the criminal law.
33. 3 10 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). Under Socony, the plaintiff does not have the burden of proving
that the defendant's conduct was unreasonable on economic grounds-nor, for that matter, can the
defendant evade liability by showing that his conduct was economically reasonable. kL at 220. For
example, the defendant cannot evade liability by proving that a price-fixing conspiracy -as necessary in
order to avoid "ruinous competition," a claim advanced by railroads in some of the earliest antitrust
cases. Id For a sophisticated economic treatment of the "ruinous competition" argument, see LEsTER
G. TELsnn, A THEORY OF EFmjcIENr COOPERATION (1987); George Bittlingmayer Decreasing
Average Cost and Competition:A New Look at the Addyston Pipe Case,25 J.IL & ECON. 201 (1932);
George Bittlingmayer, Price-Fixingand the Addyston Pipe Case. 5 RES. L & ECON. 57 (1933) and
Mark F. Grady, Towarda Positive Economic Theoty of Antitrust,30 ECON. INQUIRY 225 (1992).
34. Socony, 310 U.S. at 224-26 & n.59. This should be understood as an application of
traditional conspiracy doctrine.
35. This example shows how the line between specific and general intent-and between gencral
intent and no intent-changes with variation in the conduct defined by the law. Price-fixing requires an
agreement to fix prices, so a knowledge that there is agreement and that the agreennt is to fix prices
constitutes the general intent with respect to this allegation.
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the market price, and therefore could not rationally have thought that they
were going to make monopoly profits, they still may be found guilty of
conspiracy under section 1.16 Even if the defendants' motives were
demonstrably benign, they may be found in violation of section 1.37
Like the intent standard for trespass in tort law, the intent component
of the per se rule in antitrust requires only an intention to carry out the
conduct charged in the complaint. As under trespass, the plaintiff need not
show that the defendant intended to cause harm or to gain in any particular
way. Trespass doctrine permits a defendant to avoid liability if he can
show that his conduct was not voluntary, as in the case of someone thrown
off of his horse onto the plaintiff's property. However, it is difficult to see
how the involuntary-conduct defense could be applied in the section 1
context. While participants in a price-fixing conspiracy need not have the
power to carry out their scheme, each participant will have made a
conscious decision to take part in the venture.
Although proof of conduct and general intent usually will carry the
plaintiff's burden in a section 1 case, those elements will not always be
sufficient. The Court has created two exceptions to the per se rule against
price fixing, one explicit and the other implicit. The explicit exception is
that of Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
(BMI), which requires application of the reasonable conduct test in a case
where the price-fixing agreement is essential for the introduction of a new
product. 38 The implicit exception is that of Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., which requires application of the reasonable conduct test
when the defendant restricts intrabrand competition in order to enhance
interbrand competition. 39 These exceptions create two points at which the
per se conduct test yields to permit a reasonableness defense, though at
both points the general-intent standard remains.
36. For example, the defendants in American Cohlmn Co. v. United States represented only one
third of the hardwood market. 257 U.S. 377, 391 (1921). They were found guilty of violating section
1. Id. at 412. However, it is unlikely that the defendants could have had a substantial influence on the
market price of hardwood, given that they had a market share of only one-third. See DEWILY, supra
note 32, at 167-68.
37. For example, the defendants in Socony claimed that they were trying to continue their
compliance with the National Industrial Recovery Act fair competition codes, even though the statute
had been declared unconstitutional. Socony, 310 U.S. at 241.
38. 441 U.S. 1, 20-24 (1979).
39. 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977). Sylvania dealt with territorial restraints in a vertical relationship.
The Court has never clearly said that the Sylvania defense applies to the horizontal setting to create
another explicit exception to the per se rule. In NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, however, the Court referred to
the Sylvania defense as a justification for applying the rule-of-reason test. 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984),
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2. IndirectPrice-Fixing:ParallelBehavior and FacilitatingPractices

Not all price-fixing fits the classic model of agreement in a smokefilled backroom.

In other cases, plaintiffs may find it extraordinarily

difficult to prove that the parties intended to participate in a price-fixing
plan. Some commentators have urged that such cases be judged by a

different standard than applies generally to price-fixing, eliminating the
requirement that a plaintiff prove intent'4 By and large, however, courts

have not followed that approach.
Perhaps the most important category of these cases is that involving
"conscious parallelism," where one observes parallel pricing or output

decisions by a group of competitors. For example, consider the case of
several airlines simultaneously raising their prices on flights between
California and New York. Although the legal standard was unclear before
1950, the modem cases state that the plaintiff in such a case generally must
prove conspiracy.4 1 The prevailing legal rule retains the general-intent

standard, imposing a burden on plaintiffs to show that the parties' actions
provide clear evidence that they intended to fix prices through an

agreement.

Since showing similar or even identical prices is not

necessarily enough to discharge that burden,4 2 the general-intent standard

can prove to be a real stumbling block for the plaintiff in this type of case.
A similar problem arises in cases involving "facilitating practices":
information-sharing arrangements that could be used to support a price-

fixing conspiracy, such as agreements to share information on bids from
customers or information on production and marketing costs. Although the
40. This is the key implication of Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laivs: A
Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969). Posner argued that section 1 of the Sherman Act
should be interpreted in a manner that permits courts to find defendants guilty of price.fixing on the
basis of circumstantial evidence with respect to agreement and intent. Vell before Posner's influential
article, Eugene Rostow argued for more aggressive reliance on circumstantial evidence in section 1
cases. See Eugene V. Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A PositiveInstrunment ofProgressi 14 U. Citi. L
REv.567 (1947).
41. Se4 e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597 n.21 (1936)
("[C]onduct that is as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not,
without more, support even an inference of conspiracy."). Of course, the plaintiff could still rely on
circumstantial evidence. However, the circumstantial evidence must be of a sort that "tends to exclude
the possibility" that the alleged conspirators acted independently. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Smrv.
Corp., 465 U.S. 752,764 (1984).
42. Although such pricing evidence is consistent with an intent to fix prices, in many settings
there may be other possible explanations for the fact that competitors price their products identically.
For example, basing-point pricing schemes often result in identical prices (to several decimal places).
yet it does not follow from this that there is a conspiracy with respect to price. See David D. Haddock.
Basing-PointPricing:Competitive vs. Collusive Theories, 72 A.M. EcoN. REv. 289, 303-34(19321.
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issue in these cases has been referred to as one of choosing between a per
se or rule-of-reason standard,43 the rule in these cases, as in other pricefixing cases, is that any agreement to fix prices is presumptively
unlawful-that is, the per se rule for conduct coupled with the generalintent standard.
The key issue in facilitating-practices cases is not what conduct
standard to apply but, rather, what counts as proof of intent and agreement
to fix prices. Since a decision to share information could be strong or weak
evidence that parties agreed to fix prices, the Court generally has required
additional evidence of an intent to fix prices, separate from proof of the
44
intent to share information or to engage in other challenged practices.
But in cases where the risk of the challenged practice developing into fullblown price-fixing is especially high-e.g., where there is an oligopolistic
market with relatively inelastic demand and the firms share information on
current prices-the Court has inferred the necessary (general) intent from
the evidence of conduct. 45
3. Trade Restraints Generally
In addition to price-fixing through direct and indirect means, the
section 1 case law also deals with other concerted methods of restraining
trade, such as group boycotts. These cases fall outside the per se rule that
applies to price-fixing, being governed by the default standards for section
1. Following Standard Oil and Nash, the general rule for section 1 cases
combines a reasonableness standard for conduct with a general-intent
standard.
Two categories of section 1 case law are illustrative. One concerns
conduct that affects processes for price-setting, but that should not be
For example, National Society of
characterized as price-fixing.
ProfessionalEngineers v. United States involved a rule promulgated by the
professional engineers' society prohibiting members from bargaining over
price before accepting a contract.4 6 The Supreme Court found the
restriction sufficiently remote from a concerted effort to fix prices that it
would not apply the per se rule, opting for the reasonableness rule
instead.47 Similarly, in Board of Trade v. United States, the Court
43. See, e.g, ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KoVAcic, ANTITRUST LAW AND EcONOMICS
240-47 (4th ed. 1994) (discussing legal standards applied to information sharing arrangements).
44. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 584-85 (1925).
45. United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337-38 (1969).
46. 435 U.S. 679, 683 (1978).
47. See id. at 692.
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characterized the Board's "call rule" as a restriction on the period of pricesetting rather than the actual prices.8 The other set of cases involves group
boycotts. In Northwest Wholesale Stationers v.Pacific Stationery &
Printing Co., the Court announced that the rule-of-reason test applies

generally to boycotts, with a possible exception for the case where the
boycotting group has "market power
or exclusive access to an element
49
essential to effective competition."

C. SECTION 2 LEGAL STANDARDS

The Supreme Court's decision in Socony to apply the fiamework-of-

conspiracy doctrine to price-fixing essentially fixed the conduct and intent
standards at the core of section 1. Standard Oil declared the rule-of-reason

test as the default conduct rule for both section 1 and section 2 cases.
However, there has been less clear guidance in section 2 cases. The
specific meaning of the reasonableness test applied under section 2 has
varied over time as section 2 doctrine has developed, 0 and the courts have
not provided clear, explicit direction on the intent standard in section 2. In
spite of this, the case law does reveal the contours of the intent standard
courts have been using under section 2.
1. Reasonablenessand Alcoa
Any discussion of the legal standard under section 2 must take Judge

Hand's opinion in Alcoa as the starting point, since the opinion sought both
to clarify and to modify the legal rule of section 2.51 In an opinion that set
48. 246 U.S. 231, 239 (1918).
49. 472 U.S. 284,296 (1985).
50. One might think that application of the reasonableness test to section 2 accounts for much of
the difference in doctrinal clarity between section I and section 2. Typically, a reasonableness test
gives less guidance to courts than a per se rule;
some judgments that are nude through case-by-case
application of a reasonableness standard commonly are internalized in a per se rule. See, e.g.,
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RUt.E-BAsED
DECISION-MAKING INLAW AND IN LIFE 12-14,93-100, 137-45 (1991). This does not nake one or the
other necessarily a better rule, though it will give the per se test a more "rule-like" quality. Judgments
respecting what is and what is not reasonable will differ across time, circumstances, and
decisionmakers. However, even if we limit our focus to only those cases subject to the reasonableness
test, both under section 1 and under section 2, it remains the case, as we hope to make clear in this
Section, that the section 2 reasonableness test has evolved in a less direct, linear fashion than the section
1 test.
51. Before the Alcoa decision, the conduct standard under section 2 was the abuse formula
announced in StandardOil. The abuse standard condemned conduct that would have violated section 1
if engaged in by a group of firms:
[HIaving by the first section forbidden all means of monopolizing trade ...the second section
seeks, if possible, to make the prohibitions of the act all the more complete and perfect by
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the course for the modem legal standard under section 2, Judge Hand held
that Alcoa violated section 2 of the Sherman Act through its aggressive
efforts to expand capacity, which had the effect of deterring entry by
potential rivals. Under Hand's Alcoa doctrine, the operative conduct test

under section 2 is a reasonableness test that adjudges a defendant liable if
the plaintiff establishes that the defendant has monopoly power in the

market at issue; has engaged in conduct that has an exclusionary effect; and
that the exclusion of others cannot be attributed to the defendant's good
luck or superior skill, foresight, and industry.5 2 Translated into the terms of
economists, the Alcoa doctrine requires monopoly power and proof that the
anticompetitive harms of the defendant's conduct outweigh its consumer
benefits. The associated intent rule under Alcoa is a general-intent test.
Judge Hand did not think that a specific intent to stifle competition was

required,3 because "no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is
5

doing."

There has been some debate over the appropriate characterization of
the rule announced by Judge Hand. For example, Steven Salop and Craig
Romaine have suggested that Alcoa announces a per se rule that applies to

any exclusionary conduct by a firm with monopoly power.54 This may be a
fair description of the full implication of the Alcoa decision, since Judge
Hand gave short shrift to Alcoa's efficiency arguments. However, if we
take the Alcoa decision at face value, it is apparently announcing a
reasonable conduct standard, not a per se standard:
It does not follow because "Alcoa" had such a monopoly, that it
"monopolized" the ingot market: it may not have achieved monopoly;
embracing all attempts to reach the end prohibited by the first section .... even although the
acts by which such results are attempted to be brought about or are brought about be not
embraced within the general enumeration of the first section.
Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 61. The abuse standard suggests that a monopolist violates section 2 when
refusing to deal with a customer or supplier in a setting in which such conduct would have the effect of
foreclosing that customer or supplier from the market. For example, the monopolist newspaper in
Lorain JournalCo. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951), which was found in violation of section 2 for
refusing to deal with advertisers who gave business to a new, fledgling radio station, presumably would
have violated the abuse standard. The Court failed to provide a clear statement of the associated intent
requirement; however, the cases suggest that proof of specific intent was required. For example, in
Standard Oil, the Court referred to the defendant's acquisitions as giving rise to the "prima facie
presumption of intent and purpose to maintain the dominancy over the oil industry, not as a result of
normal methods of industrial development, but by new means of combination." Standard Oil, 221 U.S.
at 75.
52. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 429-30.
53. Id. at 432. Soon after the Alcoa decision, the Court said, in United States v. Griffith, that
specific intent need not be proven in a monopolization case, provided there is evidence of success on
the defendant's part. 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948).
54. Salop & Romaine, supra note 3, at 650.
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monopoly may have been thrust upon it.... Since the Act makes
"monopolizing" a crime, as well as a civil wrong, it would be not only
unfair, but presumably contrary to the intent of Congress, to include such
instances. A market may, for example, be so limited that it is impossible
to produce at all and meet the cost of production except by a plant large
enough to supply the whole demand. Or there may be changes in taste or
in cost which drive out all but one purveyor. A single producer may be
the survivor out of a group of active competitors, merely by virtue of his
superior skill, foresight, and industry. In such cases a strong argument
can be made that, although, the result may expose the public to the evils
of monopoly, the Act does not mean to condemn the resultant of those
very forces which it is its prime object to foster finis opus coronat. The
successful competitor,
having been urged to compete, must not be turned
55
upon when he wins.
The section 2 case law built on Alcoa's foundation reflects this

reasonableness approach, not the per se test that Salop and Romaine extract
from Judge Hand's opinion. Moreover, the reasonable conduct standard
adopted in Alcoa has survived in the existing section 2 case law.5 6 The

common starting place for judicial analysis of monopolization claims under
section 2 is the formulation given in United States v. Grinnell Corp., which

incorporates Alcoa by requiring proof of (1) monopoly power and (2)
acquisition or maintenance of that power through means other than superior
skill, foresight, and industry.5 7 The conduct, thus, must differ from
ordinary competitive actions that might result in monopoly power.
2. Specific Intent in Section 2

The significant change in the legal rule since Alcoa is not its
construction as a reasonable conduct standard but the inclusion of a
specific-intent component.

The current section 2 law suggests that the

plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted solely or primarily out of
intent to gain or to maintain monopoly power. As we noted earlier, courts
have not routinely broken the legal test into a conduct component and an
intent component. Thus, the requirement that the plaintiff must prove
specific intent has to be understood as an inference drawn from the

language and the holdings of the modem section 2 cases.
55. Alcoa, 148 F. 2d at 429-30.
56. Our colleague Joe Brodley cautions that it is a mistake to take Hand's language in Alcoa at
face value-especially his treatment of the efficiency issue-without recalling the durability of the
monopoly at issue. This caution reinforces our understanding of Alcoa as applying a reasonablenss
test and also explains Alcoa's subsequent treatment by other courts.
57. 384 U.S. 563,570-71 (1966).

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:657

Paradoxically, the Supreme Court's decision in Aspen Skiing Co. v.
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.58 -a decision roundly criticized for
suggesting an extremely plaintiff-friendly conduct standardg--provides
perhaps the best evidence of the specific-intent requirement implied in the
modem section 2 cases. To understand the Court's decision in Aspen
Skiing, it is critical to keep sight of the procedural posture of the case. A
jury had concluded that Aspen Skiing's decision to discontinue a joint
marketing arrangement with its weaker competitor (Aspen Highlands) was
motivated solely by its desire to "discourage its customers from doing
business with its smaller rival." 6 ° The Supreme Court rejected Aspen
Skiing's appeal because the company failed to present credible evidence
that its actions were motivated by any pro-consumer or efficiency concerns.
The only justifications offered by Aspen Skiing for its refusal to deal with
its competitor were (1) the difficulty of monitoring the accuracy of the
method used for allocating revenue between Aspen Skiing and Aspen
Highlands and (2) its desire to disassociate itself from the inferior services
of its rival. However, both of these justifications were inconsistent with the
evidence and with Aspen Skiing's own behavior in other markets. 6 1 In
other words, the Supreme Court's holding that Aspen Skiing had violated
section 2 was premised on the fact that Aspen had a specific intent to
monopolize.
The Court's adoption of a specific-intent requirement in Aspen Skiing
is especially evident when its decision is read together with the lower
court's jury instruction:
In considering whether the means or purposes were anti-competitive
or exclusionary, you must draw a distinction here between practices
which tend to exclude or restrict competition on the one hand and the
success of a business which reflects only a superior product, a well-run
business, or luck, on the other....
...[A] company which possesses monopoly power and which refuses
to enter into a joint operating agreement with a competitor or otherwise
58. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
59. See, e.g., Alon Y. Kapen, Note, Duty to Cooperate Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act:
Aspen Skiing's Slippery Slope, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1047 (1987); David M. Rievman, Casenote, The
Grinnell Test of Monopolization Sounds a False Alarm: Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp., 28 B.C. L. REv. 415 (1987). In Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., Judge Posner treated the Aspen Skiing doctrine as largely limited to the facts of that case. 797 F.2d
370, 379 (7th Cir. 1986) ("If [Aspen Skiing] stands for any principle that goes beyond its unusual facts,
it is that a monopolist may be guilty of monopolization if it refuses to cooperate with a competitor in
circumstances where some cooperation is indispensable to effective competition.").
60. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 610.
61. Id. at 608-10.
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refuses to deal with a competitor in some manner does not violate
Section 2 if valid business reasons exist for that refusal....
... We are concerned with conduct which unnecessarily excludes or
handicaps competitors. This is conduct which does not benefit
consumers by making a better product or service available-or
in other
62
ways-and instead has the effect of impairing competition.
63
This instruction is quoted approvingly in the Court's opinion.
Although the first quoted paragraph of the instruction seems to allow bad
motives to substitute for bad conduct, the second paragraph makes clear
that good motives will exculpate. Together, the two paragraphs seem to
make specific intent to monopolize an element of section 2. If the Court
had wanted to signal its preference for a different intent standard under
section 2, the jury instruction in Aspen Skiing provided a perfect
opportunity. The Court's decision to forgo this opportunity-after quoting
the jury instruction in full-suggests that the general-intent rule of Alcoa
and its immediate progeny is no longer the operative intent standard under
section 2.

3. Specific Intent Versus Subjective Intent UnderSection 2
While the Supreme Court seems to have read the Sherman Act as
imposing a specific-intent requirement, it apparently has not taken the
further step of imposing a subjective-intent requirement, which would rest
on evidence purporting directly to describe the defendant's intent.
Subjective-intent standards in antitrust would move beyond making
inferences about intent from evidence of the actions taken by firms. The
obvious source of additional evidence would be statements by defendants
about the impact a given action would have on the competitive
environment faced by the firm.
The problem with subjective-intent evidence in this context is twofold. First, it is difficult to obtain reliable evidence of subjective intent for
a firm's business practices. The problem is not the well-understood point
that entities such as corporations, as distinct from individuals, cannot form
an intent. 64 Although that point is valid for firms, as it is for all groups, it is
still useful to treat a group activity as purposive in many settings. 65 The
62.

Id. at 596-97 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

63.

Id.

64. Cf Kenneth Shepsle, CongressIs a "The7i;" Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron. 12
INT'LREv. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).

65.

A similar understanding is integral to Lon Fuller's approach to legal interpretation. See LoN

L. FULLER, THE MoRALrry OF LAw (rev. ed. 1969). However, our point here can be illustrated by a
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problem, rather, is that the comments made by individuals within a firm
can be misleading if taken at face value as evidence of corporate intent,
given the common practice of speaking in the language of war or of sports
66
contests.
Second, subjective-intent evidence is often of relatively modest value.
Where there is a real intent to do something illegal, well-advised firms are
unlikely to provide much in the way of helpful evidence. Lawyers will
routinely advise clients not to leave in their files any memoranda or
statements suggesting a desire to eliminate competitors. 67 If antitrust
plaintiffs were required to prove subjective intent through reference to
statements that provided clear evidence of state of mind, it would be the
extraordinary case where any firm would retain "smoking gun" memoranda
68
in their files.
Perhaps in response to these problems, the Supreme Court has

suggested a preference for the objective approach to intent. Consider again
the Court's analysis in Aspen Skiing. It is consistent with an objective

approach to determining specific intent. Under an objective approach, a
court infers specific intent on the basis of evidence indicating the absence

of credible efficiency justifications for the monopolists' conduct.

The

Court necessarily took this approach in Aspen Skiing because the plaintiffs
had no evidence of subjective intent. The lower court decision was based
entirely on the defendant's inability to provide a credible efficiency
justification.
simple example. Each member of a professional football team may have a different set of goals, One
may want to be traded from his current team; others may be focused on attaining particular individual
records. All of the players together, however, can be seen as sharing a purpose of winning. Individual
behavior may not be perfectly congruent with this goal-largely because of the pull of other, divergent
goals-but this is the central, shared goal toward which the players as a group strive. So too, despite
the different individual interests pulling in diverse directions, it is reasonable to see the various
individuals in profit-seeking businesses as united in pursuit of making money.
66. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 190 (1976)
("Especially misleading here is the inveterate tendency of sales executives to brag to their superiors
about their competitive prowess, often using metaphors of coercion that are compelling evidence of
predatory intent to the naive.").
67. See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. iTT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983)
(noting that under a predation test based on intent, knowledgeable firms would refrain from an "overt
description" of foreseeable anticompetitive consequences); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 6.5a, at 281 (2d ed. 1999).
68. Certainly, as every plaintiff will argue, such memoranda could be the residue of a firm whose
management is so oblivious to the wrongfulness of its intent to undermine market operations that they
never consider the possibility that honest declaration of their intent to undermine competition would
present legal problems. But there is little reason to expect that this would explain most cases. See, e.g.,
POSNER, supra note 66, at 189-90 (discussing ambiguity of subjective-intent evidence); HOVENKAMP,
supra note 67, at 281.
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The Court's decision in Eastman Kodak Co. i% Image Technology
Services, Inc.69 provides another perspective on the specific-intent
requirement, one that permits us to approach the question from a
procedural starting point opposite to that of Aspen Skiing. In Eastman
Kodak, the Court refused to grant summary judgment on the section 2
claims, even though the Court acknowledged that "[1]iability turns, then, on
whether 'valid business reasons' can explain Kodak's actions"7 and that
Eastman Kodak had several business reasons that could explain its actions.
One could argue that Eastman Kodak undermines the specific-intent
requirement, since the decision can be read as lowering the bar plaintiffs
must clear in order to show specific intent from the standard defined by the
Supreme Court in other section 2 cases.' But the Court's disposition of
the section 2 claims in Eastman Kodak is better seen as an effort to
implement the specific-intent standard described in Aspen Skiing. The
decision in Eastman Kodak recognizes that the test for specific intent
cannot be whether any plausible efficiency justification can be conceived;
for if that were the test, defendants almost never would lose. Plausible
efficiency justifications are, after all, easy to generate.
The Court's opinion in Eastman Kodak implies that credible
efficiency justifications-not those that are merely plausible-would
suffice to defeat a finding of specific intent to undermine competition? 2
The plausible efficiency justification is one that could hold under
hypothetical conditions; the credible efficiency justification is one that
seems likely to explain actions under the actual conditions. The Eastman
Kodak decision fits the credible-efficiency-justification approach to an
objective, specific-intent standard. Although Eastman Kodak's efficiency
justifications were arguably plausible, the plaintiffs had raised sufficient
doubt as to their credibility to make summary disposition inappropriate
under an objective, specific-intent standard. 3
Eastman Kodak's consistency with a specific-intent requirement is
clarified when other cases, in addition to Aspen Skiing and Eastman Kodak,
69.

504 U.S. 451 (1992).

70.

Id.at 483 (emphasis added) (quoting Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Shipping Corp..

472 U.S. 588, 605 (1985)).
71.

Indeed, in addition to the fact that Eastman Kodak seems to deviate from the objective

approach to specific intent implicit in earlier antitrust cases, the decision apparently weakens
intellectual property rights, some scholars have argued, by inviting an inquiry into the subjective intent
behind a refusal to license. See, e.g., David McGowan, Nenorks and Intention in Antitntst and
IntellectualProperty, 24 J. CORP. L. 485 (1999).
72. EastmanKodak, 504 U.S. at 478-79.
73. Id.
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are examined. For example, the specific-intent requirement is a clear
implication of the Court's analysis of predatory pricing doctrine since
Matsushita Electric Industries Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.74 Matsushita,
Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 75 and several
important appellate court decisions such as A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v.
Rose Acre Farms,Inc.7 6 and Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp.7 7 all
indicate that plaintiffs must present evidence of a specific intent to
monopolize if they are to prevail in a predatory pricing case! 8 This is a
direct implication of the "objective reasonableness" standard adopted in
Matsushita. Under the Matsushita standard, a plaintiff in a predatory
pricing case must present evidence suggesting that his claim is objectively
reasonable in order to survive a motion for summary judgment. In the
predatory pricing context, objective reasonableness requires evidence that
the defendant could reasonably expect to recoup its losses from a predatory
79
campaign.
The recoupment test now firmly required under section 2 is another
way of stating the requirement that a plaintiff provide objective proof of a
specific intent to undermine competition. The recoupment test demands
that predatory pricing plaintiffs present evidence demonstrating that the
defendant's price cuts would have been unprofitable if the price cuts did
not have the effect of eliminating or reducing competition and that there
was a reasonable basis to believe that defendant would be able to profit
from the price cuts by virtue of the elimination (or dramatic reduction) of
competition.8" Given such evidence, the proper inference is that the
defendant had a specific intent to monopolize or, equivalently, to create
effective barriers to competition.8 1 In other words, the recoupment test of
the modem predatory pricing case law effectively imposes a specific-intent
standard on plaintiffs that must be met by objective evidence.
74. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
75. 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
76. 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989).
77. 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983).
78. These cases, though consistent with this analysis, do not all directly indicate the nature of the
evidence required to sustain the plaintiffs burden on the intent issue. However, as we argue in the text,
they construct an objective test for predation that effectively requires plaintiffs to show that the
defendant had a specific intent to monopolize.
79. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588-89.
80. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 224. See also Matsushita,485 U.S. at 588-89.
81. See Salop & Romaine, supra note 3, at 650 (discussing predatory pricing doctrine and
purpose inquiry).

ANTITRUST INTENT

2001]

Ill. JUSTIFYING LEGAL STANDARDS
The core of our analysis consists of conduct, intent, and proof
standards. Conduct standards typically come in one of two forms: per se
(strict) liability or a reasonableness rule. Intent standards typically require
either general or specific intent. Standards of proof usually require proof
by a preponderance of the evidence or beyond reasonable doubt. The
effective legal standards existing in any area of the law can be viewed as
combinations of conduct, intent, and proof standards.
Generally, the components of legal rules can be aligned along a
continuum and grouped in different combinations, 82 but we have identified
three rule types that represent the most important categories for antitrust
and common law. These are (1) per se liability combined with general
intent, (2) reasonable conduct combined with general intent, and (3)
reasonable conduct coupled with specific intent. We show in this section
how the selection of one or another of the rule types and proof standards,
especially the selection of intent tests, responds to particular constellations
of the costs and benefits of information. The framework we propose for
understanding the detailed structure of legal rules is error-cost analysis.
A. ERROR-COST ANALYSIS
Much of the commentary that explores the shape of common law and
antitrust rules uses some form of deterrence analysis, asking how a legal
rule can be framed to deter socially undesirable conduct. 83 Although
sophisticated deterrence analysis is sensitive to the social costs of
alternative rule designs,84 focusing the analysis on deterrence is potentially
misleading, making it difficult to offer a theory of intent rules.
For example, the deterrence analysis used to explain the assignment of
strict liability and negligence standards in tort law is unlikely to provide a
82. Indeed, legal rules can be more or less flexible; they can give more or less -fixed"
instructions to decisionmakers. That is a commonplace, reflected in innumerable discussions of the
differences between rules and standards, or rules and principles. See, e.g., RO."NALD DWOR UIN,
TAKUNG RIGHTS SERIoUsLY 22-28,72-80 (1977); RICHARD A. POSNER. ECONoMtic ANALYsts OF L ,v
590-95 (5th ed. 1998); SCtAuER, supranote 50,at 12-14, 93-100 (1991); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE LJ.557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in
PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687-1713 (1976).
83. For an example of such an approach in the torts context, see VILIAM M. LANDES &

RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987).
84.

See e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and

Inalienabilit: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L REV. 1089 (1972) (providing a transactioncosts-based theory of rule types).
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good explanation of intent rules.8 5 Indeed, under the deterrence analysis
used to justify conduct rules in tort law, it would appear that general intent
should always be sufficient to hold the defendant liable. The reason is
simple: if we are trying to deter bad conduct, it should make no difference
to us whether the defendant intended to carry out the act or intended to hurt
someone. As long as the defendant had a choice and made a decision to
act, simple deterrence analysis suggests that the defendant should face the
86
liability consequences of the act.
In order to justify intent rules, and to explain the detailed structure of
legal rules generally, we should focus less on the deterrence question and
more on the operational properties and consequences of a conduct rule.
Beyond the incentive effects of a conduct standard, the balance struck in
crafting legal rules should address the social costs associated with rule
application. Much of the structure of legal rules can be understood by
focusing on a rule component's effect on expected error costs. Our
hypothesis, broadly, is that both intent and proof standards are designed to
minimize the expected error costs of a legal rule.
1. Error: Types and Costs
The easiest way to see the contribution of an intent standard to
reducing expected error costs is by reference to the ideal application of a
conduct standard. Under a reasonableness standard, error occurs when a
court deems a defendant's conduct reasonable even though it actually was
unreasonable (that is, the expected harms created by the defendant's
conduct outweighed expected benefits). Similarly, error occurs under the
reasonableness test when a court deems a defendant's conduct
unreasonable even though it was in fact reasonable. We will call the first
type of error a false acquittal (though we are not focusing primarily on the
application of criminal laws) and the second type afalse conviction.
85. Consider, for example, the analysis in LANDES & POSNER, supra note 83. Because the core
of their framework is the Hand formula for negligence, Landes and Posner give scant attention in this
work to rules based on specific intent. Thus, their chapter on intentional torts examines as a class till
torts involving intentional conduct (battery, assault, false imprisonment) in an economic model that
does not require separate analysis for those torts involving specific intent (e.g., assault). See W. at 14989. Indeed, before reaching their discussion of remedies, Landes and Posner find little reason to
distinguish intentional torts from unintentional torts. See id. at 159-60. Our approach implicitly asserts
that specific-intent rules are special in the sense that they require a different liability standard (not
merely a different remedy, such as punitive damages). In the text, we aim to provide a detailed
justification for the legal tests adopted for various "specific intent" violations.
86. For an early statement of this argument as a defense of the trespass rule, see OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 97 (Belknap Press 1963) (1881).
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Error rates can be thought of, first, as the inaccurate application of a
conduct standard. But error rates can also be thought of as deviation from
an ideal. On this second view, application of a per se or strict liability
standard to a type of conduct that is generally reasonable will produce false
of instances where the
convictions. It will assign liability in a 8number
7
defendant's conduct was socially desirable.
The expected error cost associated with a legal rule is the product of
the probability of error and the cost of error. The cost of error can be
attributed to several sources. Error can lead to underdeterrencecosts if it
causes actors to fail to comply with the reasonableness rule because they
discount the likelihood of ever being held liable for unreasonable conduct.
Error can also lead to overdeterrencecosts if it causes actors to go beyond
the reasonable level of precaution or forbearance in avoiding harms. A
final error cost consists of administrativeor litigation costs.
The structure of each legal rule should be such that the sum total of
error costs is minimized. In many circumstances, selecting the appropriate
intent standard is critical to this goal. But before turning to the contribution
of intent standards, we review the relation of errors to incentives under the
reasonableness test, an example of a simple conduct standard.
2. Incentive Effects of Error
In a world where courts are less than perfect, there are errors
associated with every legal test. Replacing rule A with rule B means
exchanging the errors associated with A for those associated with B. It is
important to know not only how many errors are associated with alternative
rules but also the types of errors the alternative rules generate. We can
distinguish two general types of error rates: asymmetric and symmetric.
Rule A and B might have similar error rates, but different types. Rule A's
87. This is a good point at which to confront a problem suggested by the literature on deterrence
in tort law. Under the economic analysis of torts presented by Landes and Posner, strict liability and

negligence lead to the same level of precaution (or forbearance) among potential injurers. L.uDEs &
POSNER, supranote 83, at 64-65. Put another way, the strict liability and reasonableness standards lead

to the same conduct. This suggests that we should not be concerned at all wvith the errors generated by
applying a strict liability standard instead of a reasonableness standard, because such errors are costless.
This proposition is incorrect, however, for at least two reasons. First, if precaution or forbearance on
the part of the potential victim is desirable, a reasonableness standard may be superior because it
provides the appropriate incentives to potential victims. See it at 69. Second. if the defendant's
conduct provides substantial external benefits to potential victims, strict liability may be inferior to the
reasonableness rule because it causes potential defendants to reduce the scale of their activities. See
Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets 7Teor, of Tort Law, 90 Nw. U. L Ri-%. 977, 977 (1996). For the
most part, our analysis in the text focuses on the purpose of intent rules rather than the choice betcen
strict (per se) liability and reasonableness tests.
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errors would be symmetric if A generates roughly equal probabilities of
false acquittals and false convictions.
Rule B's errors would be
asymmetric if B's application generates larger numbers of false convictions
than false acquittals (or vice versa).
The nature of error rates generated by a legal rule and the change in
rates that would occur if a different rule were adopted can be surmised in
many instances, though it will not always be obvious on the face of a rule.
Consider the custom rule in tort law, under which courts generally refuse to
find a physician's conduct unreasonable (negligent) if he or she has
complied with the customs of the medical profession.88 Given their lack of
information on the science and practice of medicine, juries might deem
more or less activity unreasonable than if they were perfectly informed as
to the costs and benefits of alternative medical procedures. In other words,
relative to an error-free regime, a shift to a reasonable conduct standard
unconstrained by considerations of custom probably would generate a
89
symmetrical increase in error types.
Now consider the function of the custom rule in comparison to an
unconstrained reasonableness inquiry (i.e., reasonableness divorced from
custom). Such a rule change (from unconstrained reasonableness to the
custom rule) probably would lead to a greater reduction in the number of
false convictions than in the number of false acquittals. The change would
lead to an asymmetric distribution of errors-indeed, perhaps with a
reduction in false convictions coupled with an increase in false acquittals.
The reason for the asymmetry in error types is that the likelihood of an
error in favor of the defendant probably increases if he is judged by the
customs of his profession. Medical customs are likely to be reasonable,
and physicians are likely to comply with them. Accordingly, most false
convictions will occur in the presumably rare cases where the physician
complied with the custom but failed to convince the jury of such
88. As a rule, custom is relevant to, but not dispositive of, the determination of negligence. The
medical profession, however, has received different treatment, with a physician's adherence to custom
being treated in many jurisdictions effectively as conclusive evidence that the physician was not
negligent. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, § 32, at 185-96; Allen H. McCoid, The Care
Required of Medical Practitioners,12 VAND. L. REv. 549, 605-14 (1959).
89. Our tentative assertion that the increase would be symmetrical is in part a simplifying
assumption, and in part based on Holmes' view that an unconstrained reasonableness inquiry would
leave the jury "oscillating to and fro" with respect to the negligence standard. See HOLMES, supra note
86, at 98. Alternatively, the jury might be inclined to decide against physicians who failed to take a
particular precaution, which would generate an asymmetrical increase (relative to an crror-free regime)
in errors, leading to more false convictions than false acquittals. See infra note 96 and accompanying
text. Whether the reasonableness rule generates an asymmetrical or symmetrical increase in errors is
not central to the argument we make.
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compliance. 90 Most false acquittals, on the other hand, will occur when the
physician complied with a custom that was in fact unreasonable. If a
nontrivial percentage of customs are outdated or insufficiently developed,
this could generate a substantial number of false acquittals.
We can illustrate this point with a numerical example.

Suppose

malpractice disputes are drawn randomly from the population of physicianpatient interactions (operations) at a rate of 1 out of every 10. Suppose

95% of doctors comply with the medical customs while 5% fail to comply.
Suppose that in 1 out of every 20 cases courts erroneously conclude that the
physician failed to comply with custom when in fact the physician did.
Finally, suppose 15% of medical customs are outdated. From a base of
10,000 operations, 950 malpractice disputes would occur involving doctors

who complied with the standard, of which 807 would involve doctors who
complied with good (not outdated) standards, and 40 of those would result

in false convictions. The same assumptions give rise to 142 cases
involving doctors who complied with an outdated rule and 135 false
acquittals.

Of course, an asymmetric distribution of error types need not occur
under the custom rule. For example, if all doctors comply with custom,
and all customs are reasonable, then the only type of error that can occur is

a false conviction. Our illustration adopts the assumption, which we regard
as plausible, that the likelihood of an erroneous finding with respect to

custom compliance is less than the likelihood that a particular custom will
be outdated.
Our discussion of the custom example helps to clarify the meaning of

"error probability" in our analysis.

Generally, we are referring to the

frequency of error in the complex, Bayesian sense, 9 1 taking into account
90. Another set of false convictions includes the case where a physician (reasonably) deviated
from the custom and failed to justify the deviation. But this is a very small group to begin with. For
example, if only five percent of physicians deviate from custom, this is a small base from which to
consider the rate of false acquittals. Given the likely insignificance of this component of error. we ill
exclude it from consideration here.
91. More formally, let P(GII) be the probability that the court holds the defendant guilty even
though he is innocent. Let P(GIN) be the probability the court holds the defendant guilty %%henhe is
guilty. Let P(I) be the probability that the defendant is innocent (or the share of innocent defendants in
the pool of litigants reaching final judgment). Then the probability a conviction is false, P(IIG), is.
using Bayes' theorem, P(GII)P(I)/[P(GII)P(I)+P(GIN)(I-P(W))]. P(GII) corresponds to the "simple
error" (orjudicial error) described in the text. P(IIG) is the more complex notion of error referred to in
the text. Note that if the shares of innocent and guilty defendants are the same (i.e.. P(I) = 12). these
two notions of error are identical. Thus, if the legal rule induces no asymmetry in the shares of guilty
and innocent defendants in court, our complex and simple notions of error are equivalent, and the
probability ofjudicial error tells us everything we need to know about the number of false convictions
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changes in the underlying base-populations from which disputes are drawn.
This is the sense that translates easily into statements about the numbers of
false convictions relative to false acquittals. Thus, if a move from rule A to
rule B generates a substantial increase in the likelihood that a particular
defendant type (e.g., guilty defendants) will litigate, our conception of the
probability of error takes into account the implications of such an increase
for the numbers of false convictions and false acquittals. There is a simpler
notion of error referring to the likelihood that a judge will make a mistake
in a particular case. The frequency of false convictions will be a function
of this simple error (judicial error) and the underlying distribution of
defendant types.
Asymmetries in simple error rates coupled with
asymmetry in the distribution of defendant types can make the frequency of
false convictions larger (or smaller) than one would surmise on the basis of
an examination of the likelihood of judicial error in a particular case.
We want to emphasize two points about the relation between errors
and incentive effects. The first is that whether a rule overdeters,
underdeters, or deters optimally depends upon the distribution of errors.
By that, we mean the symmetry or asymmetry of errors in addition to the
way errors increase or decrease in relation to the behavior to be sanctioned.
The second is that even though error may lead to overdeterrence or
underdeterrence under a reasonable conduct rule, the more likely effect is
overdeterrence.
4. Incentive Effects of ErrorUnder a Reasonable Conduct Standard:An
Illustration
We will illustrate these points with the following example: Suppose
the owner of a cricket field has to decide whether to raise his fence to
prevent balls from flying over and injuring passers-by on adjacent streets.
The fence is now at 12 feet, and the expected harm to passers-by is $301.
The owner can raise the fence in one-foot increments at a cost of $50 per
foot. The expected harm to passers-by for each fence height between 12
feet and 18 feet is as follows:

(and false acquittals). On Bayes' theorem and the law, see generally David Kaye, Probability Theory
Meets Res Ipsa Loquitur,77 MICH. L. REV. 1456 (1979) and Laurence H. Tribe, Trialby Mathematics:
Precisionand Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971).
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Fence
Height

12'

13'

14'

15'

16'

17'

18'

$301

$250

$175

$100

$65

$40

$30

Expected

Harm

Now look at three versions of the possible effects of the owner's
decision. In both of the settings indicated in Figure 2 and Figure 3, the

owner faces a legal rule that generates symmetric errors, though with
different error rates across cases. 92 In the setting depicted in Figure 4, he
faces a rule that generates asymmetric errors.
The rules yield
underdeterrence, optimal deterrence, and overdeterrence respectively (with
the likely action indicated in bold).
Fence
Height

12'

13'

14'

15'

16'

17'

18'

$301

$250

$175

$100

$65

S40

$30

Savings

-

$1

$25

$25

-$15

-S35

-$40

Error Rate

.0

.2

.5

.5

.5

.2

.0

Expected
Liability

$301

$200

$87.5

$50

$32.5

S8

SO

-

$51

$62.5

-$12.5

- $32.5

-S25.5

-$42

Expected
Harm

Social

Private
Savings

Figure 2
92. The results in this section are consistent with the more formal treatment of uncertainty in
Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrenceand Uncertain Legal Standards.2 J.L. ECO.. & ORG.
279 (1986). Note that in the example in the text, we are relying on the simple notion of error as the
likelihood that a particular judge makes a mistake in applying the legal rule. The more complex
Bayesian notion referred to supra text accompanying note 91 is unnecessary for this discussion.
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Figure 2 reflects a judicial process that makes more errors as the fence
height approaches the threshold between reasonable (15 feet) and
unreasonable (under 15 feet), symmetrically distributed around the optimal
point. The errors have the effect of diminishing the private gain from
adding to the fence height once it is high enough to approach the
reasonableness standard, yielding underdeterrence.
Fence
Height

Expected
Harm

12'

13'

14'

15'

16'

17'

18'

$301

$250

$175

$100

$65

$40

$30

Social
Savings

-

$1

$25

$25

-$15

-$35

-$40

Error
Rate

.0

.1

.4

.5

.4

.1

.0

Expected
Liability

$301

$225

$105

$50

$26

$4

$0

Private
Savings

-

$26

$70

$5

-$26

-$28

-$46

Figure 3
Figure 3, like Figure 2, addresses a setting with symmetric errors, with
error rates altered only slightly from Figure 2. Yet, as Figure 3 shows, the
variation in error rates around the optimal point suggests a different
outcome. In this setting, although the return from actually achieving the
socially optimal (reasonable) outcome is muted by errors, the owner's
private savings from increasing the height of the fence induces optimal
expenditures.
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Fence
Height

12'

13'

14'

15'

16'

17'

18'

Expected
Harm

$301

$250

$175

$100

$65

$40

$30

Social
Savings

-

$1

$25

$25

-$15

-$35

-$40

Error
Rate

.0

.0

.0

.8

.4

.1

.0

Expected
Liability

$301

$250

$175

$80

$26

$4

$0

Private
Savings

-

$1

$25

$45

$4

-$28

-$46

Figure 4
Figure 4 shows the effect of asymmetric errors. Symmetric errors can

yield varied outcomes, but asymmetric errors push expenditures away from
the optimum, in this case producing overdeterrence.

Although we could equally well present a table showing asymmetric
errors leading to underdeterrence, we have chosen this example for a
reason. We think there is a greater probability that error in the application
of conduct rules will result in overdeterrence. 93 This is due largely to the

tendency for errors (simple errors) to be asymmetric, in the sense
(suggested in Figure 4) that a potential defendant who fails to forbear or

take a salient precaution is more likely, other things being equal, to have
93. Note that this conclusion differs from that of Craswell & Calfee, supra note 92. Craswell
and Calfee generate overdeterrence in cases where the error probability distribution has a low variance
around the optimal level of care. This is certainly consistent with Figure 4. Moreover, if we interpret
Craswell and Calfee's variance result as saying that overdeterrence is more likely when almost all ofthe
uncertainty is located in the region of the reasonablenessthreshold, then it provides a powerful and
sufficient reason for our conclusion. However, we emphasize a different reason in the text. Note also
that we are assuming defendants are not judgment-proof; such defendants are unlikely to be deterred by
the threat of litigation. See S.Shavell, The Judgment ProofProblem, 6 IN'IL REv. L & EcO. . 45
(1986).
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the error go against him than for it to weigh in his favor. 94 This effect can
be amplified by the influence of litigation costs.
One can offer a simple explanation for the claim that errors will tend
to go against the defendant who fails to take care, a reason that does not
rely on the assumption that courts are inherently biased. Because of limited
information on the social costs and benefits of certain conduct, courts are
likely to put a great deal of weight on the absence of a particular
precaution. 95 That is, instead of trying to determine the optimal fence
height as a starting point, courts tend to focus on the plaintiffs claim that
the defendant failed to forbear or to take a particular precaution-that the
defendant failed to raise the fence a certain number of feet, to put netting
over the fence, and so on. Ideally, a reasonableness determination would
require a court to compare the cost of the forgone precaution to its social
benefit (in terms of harm reduction). However, as neither the cost nor the
social benefit can be measured precisely, courts are put in the position of
making inferences. Unless there is concrete evidence (i.e., more than the
defendant's word) that the cost of precaution is unusually high for the
defendant, the rational inference is that the defendant acted negligently.
Thus, the structure of decisionmaking in courts should tend to produce
more errors against than in favor of defendants who fail to take a salient
96
precaution.
We note that there is an alternative behavioral theory of error bias that,
like the one presented here, does not assume an inherent preference for
plaintiffs. The bias typically is explained by the fact that the decisionmaker
is choosing between imposing liability on a defendant who has insured or
who otherwise is able to allocate some portion of such costs to others and a
plaintiff who seems less able to do so (especially since an insurance option
94. The deterrence implications of this assumption are spelled out formally infra note 103.
95. See Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions,18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1989).
96. The outcome depends as well on other aspects of the court system's performance. See, e.g.,
Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE L.J. 799 (1983); Marcel
Kahan, Causation and Incentives to Take Care Under the Negligence Rule, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 427
(1989). Grady and Kahan show that overdeterrence may occur (note that our claim in the text is
stronger) if the court applies a negligence standard without reducing the defendant's damages by the
amount that would have occurred even if the defendant had complied with the due care standard, Put
another way, if courts apply the causation standard rigorously, overdeterrence will not result. However,
the causation requirement is not applied rigorously in all cases falling under a reasonable conduct
standard. For example, in many negligence cases where causation is uncertain-e.g., medical
malpractice actions for "lost chance of survival" where the plaintiff had more than a fifty percent
chance of survival before the accident-courts award plaintiffs their full damages without deducting the
amount that would have been suffered in any event. See, e.g., Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664
P.2d 474, 475-79 (Wash. 1983) (discussing "all or nothing" approach in majority of states).
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cannot be exercised retroactively). 97

An erroneous pro-plaintiff finding

will have implications for costs among a wider class of people, but these
costs are apt to be minuscule in relation to the expenditures of the class so
long as other legal fact finders do not similarly err. An erroneous prodefendant finding, however, will impose obvious costs on an individual
whose distress is evident to the fact finder.

Now consider the influence of litigation costs. In general, in a setting
with legal error and costly litigation, the reasonableness (or, in this case,
negligence) test can overdeter, underdeter, or optimally deter-all three

outcomes are possible.98 Litigation costs have conflicting effects on the
incentives for precaution. On one hand, since litigation is costly for
plaintiffs, the cost will prevent some victims from bringing suit,9 9 which

weakens the incentive for precaution. 10 On the other hand, since the
defendant must pay to litigate as well, expected liability for potential
defendants increases with the cost of litigation, which increases the

incentive for precaution. In regimes with symmetric litigation costs for
plaintiffs and defendants, the effect of litigation costs on deterrence is
uncertain. In some areas of litigation, however, litigation costs are
relatively low for plaintiffs and high for defendants. This occurs, for
97. See, e.g., PETER IV. HUBER, LiABtLrry: THE LEGAL REVOLLION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
(1988); RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MEss (1988); WALTER K. OLSON, TilE LIIGATIO N
EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAW\SUIT (1991). Although these
books are not works of "cognitive science:' their jury-bias arguments reflect hypotheses regarding
common cognitive or decision biases. The empirical support for these theories is mixed and largely
anecdotal. Examination of tried cases reveals that plaintiffs lose more often in personal injury litigation
than in commercial litigation, data that are inconsistent with a jury-bias story. However, evaluation of
these data is complicated by distortion in the selection of cases for trial. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross &
Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Gearedto Settlement, 44 UCLA L REV. 1,
7 (1996). For a broad review of civil juries' operation, see Developments in the is.-The Civil Jury.
110 HARV. L. REv. 1408 (1997).
98. Keith N. Hylton, Costly Litigationand Legal ErrorUnder Negligence, 6 J.L ECON. & ORG.
433,450 (1990).
99. This reflects the assumption that plaintiffs will not bring suit %%henthe cost of litigating
exceeds the expected recovery, a standard assumption in the economic analysis of litigation. See, e.g,
Keith N. Hylton, The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence Under Strict Liability and Under
Negligence, 10 INT'L REv. L. & ECoN. 161, 163 (1990). Whether this assumption is valid in all cases
depends upon plaintiffs' ability to generate settlements without the full investment in litigation costs.
Suppose, for example, that litigation occurs in two discrete stages. If the plaintiff can credibly threaten
to go through the second stage, he may have an incentive to file suit in order to obtain a settlement after
the first stage, even though the total cost of litigation (summing both stages) is less than the expected
final judgment. For a formal presentation of this argument, see Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, A Neiw' Theory
Concerning the Credibilityand Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (19961. Of course, if
the first-stage expenses are sufficiently high, this outcome will not be observed. The discussion in the
text reflects the view that taking account of settlements, while essential to a full understanding of
incentive effects of legal rules, would complicate the analysis without changing the basic point.
100. See Hylton, supranote 99, at 163.
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example, where a defendant bears a heavier burden of producing

information relevant to the litigation or where a defendant has a greater
stake in the outcome of the litigation (e.g., the defendant has reputation

costs at stake or risks follow-up litigation, while plaintiffs do l not).
In such
t
regimes, litigation costs are likely to generate overdeterrence. 0

Thus, although overdeterrence is by no means guaranteed under a

reasonable conduct rule, it is the more likely result in view of the probable
asymmetry in simple errors (judicial mistakes). 10 2 Moreover, any
overdeterrence associated with a reasonableness standard will tend to be

exaggerated by other potential factors, including general increases in error
probabilities, asymmetric litigation costs burdening defendants, and
assessment of legal damages in excess of the real social loss associated
with the defendant's conduct. 1°3 We will argue below that these factors are
especially relevant in the antitrust context.
101. For example, under a regime in which the prevailing plaintiff shifts his litigation expenses to
the defendant, overdeterrence is more likely. For discussion of the incentive effects of litigation cost
apportionment rules, see Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Cost Allocation Rules and Compliance with the
Negligence Standard,22 J. LEGAL STUD. 457 (1993); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A
TheoreticalAnalysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, IIJ. LEGAL STUD.
55 (1982).
102. Some commentators argue that this is the prevalent pattern in litigation today. See, e.g.,
HUBER, supra note 97, at 153-71; NEELEY, supranote 97; OLSON, supra note 97, at 6-7.
103. Consider the following formal demonstration. Let x = the cost of taking care or forbearing,
p = probability of loss to victim if injurer does not take care or forbear, q = probability of loss to victim
if injurer does take care or forbear, p > q. Let v = loss to victim. Let 0= probability of an erroncous
finding of liability.
Under a reasonable conduct test such as the negligence test, the injurer will be held liable
whenever he fails to take care (or forbear) and x < (p-q) v. Now consider injurers for whom x > (p-q) v.
In an error-free regime, such an injurer would never be held liable. Such injurers will be held liable
only if courts make mistakes.
Now suppose the likelihood of a court making a mistake is zero if the injurer takes care or
forbears (e.g., keeps the fence well above the reasonable height). Suppose also that the probability of
error is positive at the threshold of reasonable conduct.
Consider the incentives of an injurer for whom x > (p-q) v. Overdeterrence occurs if such an
injurer is induced by the threat of liability to take care. Will this ever happen? Such an injurer will take
care if
x<p~v,
which requires (p-q) v <p v, or
(p-q)/p< 0.
Since this is clearly possible, overdeterrence can occur. For example, suppose p = 2/ and q = 1/2 Then
overdeterrence will occur whenever 0 is greater than 25%. If the probability of error is especially high
near the threshold of reasonable conduct, then 0 > 1/4may be a plausible assumption. Moreover, as this
example suggests, whenever precaution is not very productive, in the sense that (p-q) / p is close to
zero, we are likely to get overdeterrence.
Litigation costs: If litigation costs are included in the analysis, the risk of overdeterrence
increases substantially. Let c = injurer/defendant's litigation cost. In this case, overdeterrence occurs if
(p-q) v<p0(v + c),
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B. TAILORING LEGAL RULES To REDUCE ERROR COSTS
If we put to one side possible "political" preferences that might distort
the process, 4 legal rules should be designed to accomplish optimal

deterrence or governance with the lowest possible error cost. Given the
array of possible effects that errors in rule application can generate, how

should conduct rules be tailored to minimize error costs?
1. FactorsAffecting the Probability,of Error

In a legal regime that minimizes error costs, we should expect rules to
be designed to exploit environmental factors that constrain error costs. One
such factor is the competence of the court to discern reasonable conduct.
In developing the negligence rule, the paradigmatic common law example
of a reasonable conduct rule, courts have relied on the juries or judges to

use common sense to determine whether an actor was negligent. In the
routine case this has not been seen as something beyond the competence of
the court. For example, in the case of the fence around the cricket field,
courts have considered themselves competent to determine whether the

owner should raise the fence in order to cut down the risk of cricket balls
hitting pedestrians. In order to make such an assessment, the court needs
information on the likelihood that balls will sail over a fence of a given
height, the likely injuries to pedestrians, and the cost of raising the fence.
or [(p-q) Ip] [v i (v+c)] < 0, which is quite plausible. Again suppose p = 23 and q = I-. litigants often
spend a third or more of the amount at stake on litigation, so let us assume c = 1I%.In this case.
overdeterrence occurs when 0> 3116. On the one-third assumption, see JAMES S. KAFA=IK &
NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATIoN 69 (19861 (data showing
defendant's litigation costs running at roughly one third of total compensation).
Damages exceed victim's loss. Finally, it should be clear that if damages exceed the real social
loss, overdeterrence can occur. Suppose the damage award is equal to d > %:Now overdeterrenee
occurs if (p-q) v <p(d+ c).
104. Of course, as emphasized in the public-choice literature, interest-group politics plays an
obvious role in legislative decisionmaldng. See, e.g., JAMES M. BuHANAN & GORDON TuLLOCE- THE
CALCULUS OF CONSENT. LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTtmTONAL. DEMtOCRACY (1962); ROBERT
A. DAHL, DILE.MAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS. CONTROL 31-54 (1982); DEmIS C.
MUELLER, PUBUC CHOICE I: A REVISED EDITION OF PUBLIC CHOICE (1989); MANCUR OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). The samt
influences are not at work---certainly not to the same degree-where judges are the relevant
decisionmakers. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective DecisionMaking, 75 B.U. L REV. 941 (1995). Judicial decisions might be seen as responding to the same
politics as legislative decisions where judges are expected faithfully to implement legislative directives.
See e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciany in an Interest Group
Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975). But it is reasonable to expect judges to lean more
consistently toward judgments reflecting a balance of social costs and benefits. See, e.g., Richard A.
Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Usesand Limitations of PublicChoice Theoty, 1990 BYU L
REv. 827.
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In many settings, information such as this is easily discoverable-certainly,
one would expect knowledge about these issues to develop over time in a
land where cricket was commonly played and where cricket pitches tended
to be located near pedestrian walkways. 10 5 Those are the sorts of settings
in which common law courts have tended to apply reasonableness
10 6
standards.
In other areas, common law courts are less well-suited to conduct the
sort of open-ended inquiry associated with the reasonableness standard and
generally have taken steps to guard against errors by altering that

standard. 107 Again, consider the custom rule. In medical malpractice
disputes,

courts typically determine

negligence by evaluating

the

physician's compliance with customs of the medical profession. 10 8 The
custom rule is, as noted earlier, designed to avoid the errors that would
result from a system that permitted juries independently to define
10 9
reasonable medical practice in every malpractice case.
Private information is a closely related yet distinguishable factor that
can be analyzed in the same manner. If the application of a reasonable
conduct rule depends heavily on information held exclusively by one of the

parties, an error-minimizing legal rule might include a proof standard (an
evidentiary presumption) that would induce provision of the information.
This is the role performed by doctrines such as res ipsa loquitur in tort

law. 110 The res ipsa doctrine, in effect, creates a presumption of liability
that can be overcome by the defendant only by revealing private

information regarding exculpatory evidence. Thus, res ipsa has the effect
105. This does not, of course, mean that the application of a reasonableness rule in such context
will be without controversy. As one approaches the dividing line between reasonable and unreasonable
activity, fact finders surely will have different intuitions about the exact location of that line.
106. See generally HOLMES, supra note 86, at 119-29 (on the connection between common, daily
experience and negligence law).
107. In the limit case, disputes may be subject to a legal standard that is too open-ended-and
involve individuals and interests too numerous and diffuse-to be suitable for judicial decisionmaking.
See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. R v. 353, 394-404 (1978);
James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of
Adjudication, 73 COLUtnM.
L. REV. 1531 (1973).
108. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, § 32, at 185-96.
109. See, e.g., McCoid, supra note 88, at 607-08.
110. Under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, plaintiffs are allowed to submit their negligence claims
to the jury even though their evidence of negligence is largely or entirely circumstantial. See Byrne v.
Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Exch. 1863); PROSSER & KEErON, supra note 18, § 39, at 242. Other tort
law doctrines also have the effect of forcing defendants to produce evidence in order to absolve
themselves of liability for negligence. For example, where two tortfeasors act concurrently, they are
both jointly and severally liable, and the burden falls to each to limit his liability by apportioning the
harm. See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948); Kingston v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 211 N.W. 913
(Wis. 1927).
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of replacing the reasonable conduct rule with a presumptive strict conduct
rule in order to give the defendant an incentive to reveal information to the
court, thereby reducing the likelihood of error.
2. lIfluence of Intent Standardson Error
In addition to legal presumptions such as the custom rule and res ipsa,
intent standards also influence error probabilities. Like the custom rule, the
specific-intent test may simultaneously reduce the overall likelihood of
error and generate asymmetry in the distribution of errors. Consider, for
example, the legal standard for assault, which requires proof of specific
intent. Suppose courts were instead to apply to assault cases the more
common tort standard which has reasonableness and general intent as its
components. Relative to an error-free regime, a reasonableness test
coupled with general intent probably would lead to significant errors in
Determining the
favor of both the defendant and the plaintiff.
reasonableness of an alleged assault is difficult, not because the relevant
information depends upon highly specialized knowledge (as is the case in
determining reasonable medical practice), but because the reasonableness
of actions that may put others in fear of bodily harm so often is highly
dependent on nuances of context. The important though difficult-toquantify aspects of expression that can be intermingled with alleged
assaults exemplify this problem.''
The specific-intent test, like the custom rule for negligence, may
reduce the overall likelihood of error in this case relative to the
reasonableness test. Moreover, it will almost surely cause a greater
reduction in the probability of a false conviction than that of a false
acquittal. The latter effect is easy to see: Requiring specific intent biases
the legal test in favor of defendants. The former effect, an overall
reduction in the likelihood of error, is less certain. It may result, however,
if courts are more likely to reach the right conclusion (finding conduct
unreasonable only when social costs outweigh social benefits) under the
specific-intent test than under a reasonableness test that requires the
consideration of such ill-defined benefits as the value of expression.
111. The connection between assaults and expression is apparent in many of the cases, including
the earliest. For example, in Tuberville v. Savage, the plaintiff put his hand on his sword and said that if
it were not "assize-time" (i.e., if the judges were not in town), he would not tolerate the defendant's
language. 86 Eng. Rep. 684, 684 (K.B. 1669). See also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS

ON TORTS 62 (7th ed. 2000). The court rejected the defendant's claim that the plaintiff's conduct
amounted to an assault that justified his wounding the plaintiff. Tuberilleo 86 Eng. Rep. at 634. As in
Tuberville, assault cases often force courts to draw a line between threatening words and threatening
conduct. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see infra text accompan)ing notes 200-01.
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3. FactorsAffecting ErrorCosts
In some cases market (or social) factors have the effect of constraining
or increasing the error costs associated with a legal rule. In such cases,
error-minimizing courts will adopt rules that exploit the effects of
constraining factors.
Return to the custom rule in tort law. The custom rule prevents courts
from applying a reasonableness test in situations that fall outside their areas
of competence, which reduces the probabilities of false convictions and
acquittals. However, the custom rule may increase the probability of a
false acquittal, under plausible assumptions.112 Fortunately, the cost of
false acquittals under the custom rule will be constrained by other pressures
if information about physicians' practices is reasonably available to
potential patients (or other health care decisionmakers). Under plausible
assumptions about the availability of such information, physicians who
adopted practice customs that were unreasonable (causing unnecessary
harms to patients) would lose business to other physicians with better
practices, and indeed the whole profession would lose business if it adhered
to unreasonable customs. This would constrain the behavior of individual
physicians to some extent and, over time, of the profession as a whole.
Given these market pressures, the costs of false acquittals under the custom
rule should be low relative to the costs associated with errors generated
under a reasonableness test.
In contrast with this hypothetical, when an error associated with a
particular reasonableness test generates a market advantage in favor of a
particular type of defendant, it is safe to assume that the beneficiaries of the
error will act to protect and fully to exploit their advantage, increasing the
costs associated with the error. Given this danger, error-cost-minimizing
courts have limited the degree of protection provided by such rules in order
to dampen the acquisitive or "rent-seeking" 113 incentives of beneficiaries.
Nuisance rules in tort law and rules governing competition in the
market have the potential to generate market advantages for their
beneficiaries. In both settings, actions that harm an individual are protected
112. See discussion supra text accompanying note 90.
113. We will use the term "rent-seeking" with greater frequency in the remainder of the Article.
Here we use the term to refer to self-interested efforts to gain or to protect a social or market advantage.
On rent-seeking generally, see GORDON TULLOCK, THE ECONOMICS OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGE AND RENT-

SEEKING (1989); Anne 0. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON.
REV. 291 (1974). Later in the Article, we will focus on the rent-seeking incentives created by legal
rules.
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as socially beneficial, even though it is possible that an opposite conclusion
might be appropriate in a sub-class of cases. For example, nuisance law
generally does not regulate aesthetic disturbances, such as invasions of
claims to light and air. 114 An individual whose view of the beach has been
blocked by a developer cannot maintain a nuisance action. If the rule were
reversed, permitting nuisance claims for aesthetic disturbances, potential
plaintiffs could gain the power to control future development in their
communities by being the first to arrive. This would include the right to
hold up potential defendants in order to pay off difficult-to-verify claims of
aesthetic injury.
The costs associated with the creation of market advantages probably
justify the early common law regarding the reasonableness of price
competition. Courts generally refused to hold it unreasonable for one seller
to undercut the prices of another seller." 5 In other words, courts
established a per se rule in favor of price competition. This rule minimizes
the errors against socially beneficial competition and does so at low cost, as
there is no need for protracted litigation to establish the point. Suppose,
however, courts had decided to adopt a reasonableness test. Many sellers
faced with the prospect of harm from price competition would then have an
incentive to bring suit, even if they were unlikely to receive compensation
under the reasonableness test, so long as the expected value of the suit plus
suit-induced price increases exceeded the cost of litigation. The burden of
such litigation would fall primarily on those with the lowest costs (the
obvious targets for suit). Under these conditions, the threat of expensive
litigation could deter market entry by some low-cost sellers.
4. Intent Standards' and ProofRules' Effects on ErrorCosts

In an ideal world without error, a court could apply a reasonable
conduct test to all cases without having to inquire into intent (beyond the
general level) or into standards of proof. In such an ideal regime, the
reasonableness rule could be applied in a manner that punishes and
therefore deters only conduct that is socially undesirable. It follows from
this observation that many peculiar features of the law may be designed
largely to control error costs.
In a world where error has not been banished, an optimal framework
of legal rules minimizes the overall expected cost of error by making
114.

See, e.g., Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five. Inc.. 114 So. 2d 357

Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
115. See 3 WInAM BLAcKsToN,

Co.NmENTARiES *218-19.

1Fia.
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tradeoffs among different types of error and different costs-tradeoffs that
would be unnecessary in an error-free regime. For example, given a choice
between two rules, one with a high probability of a false acquittal and the
other with a high probability of a false conviction, error costs may be
minimized by choosing the rule with the higher false acquittal rate if the
cost of a false acquittal is smaller than that of false conviction. This is the
justification we have offered for the custom rule in tort law.
Intent standards also can reduce error costs, partly as a direct result of
their effect in reducing errors in rule application. Intent standards are most
important when, in addition to reducing errors, they reduce errors with high
costs, as where the error discourages especially valuable activities.
Consider, for example, the legal standard for assault, which requires proof
of specific intent. The assault standard can be justified on the ground that it
reduces errors that discourage expression," 6 which the law has long treated
as having special value. The legal rules governing assault and the custom
defense are similar in that they both induce an asymmetry in errors that
favors defendants. However, they are different in the sense that there are
distinguishable error-cost arguments favoring each rule; while the custom
rule can be defended on the ground that false acquittal costs are probably
small, the assault standard can be1 defended on the ground that false
conviction costs are probably large. 17
But intent standards can increase some types of error costs, depending
on how they are implemented. Recall our earlier discussion of Henry firing
a gun in George's direction."' If Henry is a fine marksman who enjoys
startling his friends, he presents a far different risk of harm from the
scenario wherein Henry is a less able shot who bears a grudge against
George and is trying to kill him. For this reason, getting some sense of
Henry's specific intent is helpful in determining the social risk presented by
his conduct. On the other hand, suppose Henry, intending to kill George,
aims and fires at a picture of George tacked against a tree in a desolate
116.
117.

See discussion supranote 111.
This is a good point at which to return to the punitive damages rule noted supra Figure 1.

Our theory suggests that specific intent is required for punitive damages because that standard
minimizes error costs. Given that they are potentially limitless, punitive damages are best reserved for
conduct that is always socially undesirable, in the sense that the gain to the offender is unlikely ever to
be greater than the victim's loss. See Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damagesand the Economic Theory of
Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421 (1999). Awarding punitive damages in cases outside of this category
overdeters socially desirable conduct. In order to select out those cases in which the defendant's
conduct is always socially undesirable, the specific-intent test is probably far superior to the reasonable
conduct test. Id. at 455-58. Under this view, the specific-intent test minimizes the potential error costs
associated with punitive awards.
118. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
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woods. In this case, Henry's intent is an unreliable measure of the social
risk associated with his conduct. If, as we hypothesize, intent rules reduce
expected error costs, the law generally should be constructed to avoid
reliance on intent standards that can mislead, either adopting a different

standard or insisting on a combination of intent and effect that mitigates
risks posed by the intent standard alone.
Our two descriptions of Henry's adventures illustrate the difference
between objective and subjective conceptions of specific intent. It should
be clear from this example that if we are concerned with deterring
undesirable conduct, the objective standard is more reliable. The
subjective standard is uncertain and only loosely connected to the

regulation of harmful conduct, possibly excusing Henry after he fires
directly at George and kills him, and possibly convicting Henry after he
shoots the tree. 119 Such a standard has the potential to deter some socially

desirable conduct, where there is a risk that a prosecutor or plaintiff can
find evidence of a bad intent.

Minimizing error costs also provides the standard explanation for the
burden of proof "beyond reasonable doubt' 2 ° in American criminal law.
The reasonable doubt standard obviously increases the likelihood of a false

acquittal compared to the civil preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
Moreover, the reasonable doubt standard probably increases the overall

likelihood of error. 121 However, under the prevailing view that the costs of
false convictions outweigh those of false acquittals, the reasonable doubt
1
standard probably minimizes the total costs of error. 22

119. Whether Henry is excused will turn on the conclusion respecting his state of mind and the
legal standard. If the standard is not intent to kill but reckless disregard for the possibility that he will
kill George, Henry might be convicted on the first assumed state of facts. This result, how ever, is not a
foregone conclusion.
120. The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution
require proof "beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime ... charged."
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970).
121. The preponderance standard permits courts to weigh the evidence according to its
persuasiveness and to accept the most plausible account of the facts. Provided the trial involves no
issues outside of the competence of the court-including within that caveat the provision that the court
is not affected by perceptual distortions or incentives that depart from an inclination to increase social
welfare-this should produce the smallest number of errors.
122. Two reasons can be offered for believing that fase.conviction costs are greater than falseacquittal costs. The first is that the cost of criminal punishment is often unusually large, since it often
involves the loss of liberty to the individual and the loss to society of the defendant's labor. The theory
suggested in In re Winship is that the cost to the individual (in terms of reputational harm and potential
loss of liberty) justifies the assumption that false-conviction costs outweigh false-acquittal costs. See
DtESSLER, supra note 6, at 54. We can suggest a second reason for believing false convictions are
more costly than false acquittals: In a regime in which false convictions occur frequently, dominant
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C. APPLICATION TO ANTITRUST

Antitrust provides a special and important case for the application of
an error-cost analysis of legal rules. Unlike most common law subjects,
antitrust rules govern competing claims to the allocation of consumer or
producer surplus from business activities. For these cases, competitive
conditions-not only in the narrow sense of the presence or absence of
short-run market power-play an important role in determining the costs of
error.
1. ErrorProbabilitiesin Antitrust
Error probabilities in antitrust are determined by the same factors as
observed generally: the competence of the court to apply a reasonableness
test and the allocation of private information. To the extent that a
reasonableness standard requires a court to examine business records and to
determine whether a competitive decision was justifiable in light of
business conditions, it pushes courts beyond their areas of expertise.
Moreover, reasonableness standards that cannot be applied without detailed
information exclusively within the hands of only one of the parties are
likely to result in errors asymmetrically favoring the informed party.
The per se rule of antitrust is a response to competence and private
information problems, especially the latter. Given the asymmetry in access
to private information, a requirement on the part of plaintiffs or prosecutors
to prove the unreasonableness of a pricing arrangement would give a
virtually insurmountable advantage to defendants in price-fixing cases.
The problem is not primarily, as some have argued, courts' inability to
assess whether a defendant's reasonableness arguments are valid. It is fair
enough to claim that pricing decisions often depend on considerations that
are difficult for courts to assess, but that is not the crux of the inquiry in
price-fixing cases. The greater problem is that a reasonableness inquiry in
this context would depend heavily upon information in the hands of the
defendants. In such cases, we should expect errors disproportionately
favoring defendants, generating underdeterrence costs.
A more evident competence problem is raised by Judge Hand's
application of the reasonableness test in Alcoa. Hand's approach requires a
court to examine capacity-expansion decisions to determine whether they
were made preemptively to foreclose competition or reasonably to meet
coalitions will have an incentive to use the criminal laws to punish weak coalitions. This concern is
reflected in the case law controlling the clarity of criminal statutes. See id. at 31-35.
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This standard asks judges to evaluate the basis for

capacity decisions and to assess the business opportunities facing the
industry and specific firms at the time capacity decisions were made. It
also asks judges to make decisions akin to those often assigned to members

of public utility regulatory commissions.1 24 Even regulators who are quite
familiar with the industries they oversee have difficulty making these sorts
of judgments. 125 Judges, however, seldom have familiarity with the

industries involved in monopolization cases. This makes errors especially
likely.
Error attributable to a court's lack of competence may, as we have

noted, work in favor of either defendants or plaintiffs. Still, given that such
error is likely to be most pronounced when the defendant's conduct is near

the threshold of reasonable conduct and the defendant did not forbear from
some particular act alleged to be anticompetitive, the likely effect of such
error is overdeterrence. 12 6 Indeed, in the antitrust context, the likelihood of
overdeterrence from such error is high for two additional reasons. First,
litigation costs borne by defendants are likely to be large. The antitrust

127
laws shift the litigation expenses of prevailing plaintiffs to defendants.

The issues adjudicated are complex; they relate to business decisions that

frequently cannot be evaluated without a wealth of business records; and
the potential costs of adverse decisions frequently are large.'12 8 Second,
123. See the discussion of Judge Hand's analysis in Alcoa, supratext accompanying notes 51-56.
124. We should note that there is reason to doubt that Judge Hand meant for his Alcoa test to be"
applied in this way. Judge Hand was generally quite resistant to tests that would have judges make such
intrusive determinations. See, &g., Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949). See generally
GERALD GuNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994).
125. Se4 e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITs REroR 36-59 (1982). For a general
(sympathetic) overview of agency expertise, see James 0. Freedman, Erpertise and the Administrative
Process, 28 ADN. L. REv. 363 (1976). For a more critical look at agency expertise, see Glen 0.
Robinson, The FederalConununications Commission:An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs 64 VA. L
REv. 169 (1978).
126. See discussion supra note 92 and accompanying text. One might think that this claim is
inconsistent with our initial discussion of the custom rule. We noted in that discussion that errors may
go in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant under an unconstrained reasonableness test. However, we
were unconcerned in that discussion with determining whether an unconstrained reasonableness test
(divorced from custom) presents a risk of overdeterrence. Rather, our concern was nhether the custom
rule generated asymmetric errors. If we were to reconsider the effects of an unconstrained reasonableness inquiry in the malpractice context, taking into account the arguments associated with Figures 2-4.
we would have to admit that there is a tendency toward overdeterrence, given the likelihood that a court
would find a physician liable when his conduct approached the reasonableness threshold and he failed
to take some particular precaution.
127. See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994).
128. The first two factors, complexity of issues and the need for business records. are unavoidable
components of or "inputs" into the defendant's legal argument, and in this sense are directly related to
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given that the risk of error is greatest when the court is reviewing
procompetitive conduct that harms rivals, damages designed to compensate
injured rivals will exceed the real social loss, since they do not include an
offset for the benefits to consumers. Thus, in order to steer clear of the
possibility of a monopolization suit under the Alcoa standard, firms will
have an incentive to avoid capacity-expansion investments unless they can
be defended with projections showing that the dominant firm intended to
meet a growing residual demand that could not be satisfied by competitors.
2. ErrorCosts in Antitrust
Antitrust is unique, largely in the sense that competition plays a
central role in determining the costs associated with error. The error costs
in antitrust are significantly affected by two types of competition: market
restraints and rent-seeking. By market restraints, we mean competitive
threats that prevent a party from exploiting advantages created by errors
associated with a particular legal standard. By rent-seeking, we refer to
incentives to protect, to maximize, and to exploit advantages created by
errors associated with a particular legal standard.
What are the costs associated with false acquittals and false
convictions, and how are they affected by the competitive pressures such as
market restraints and rent-seeking? We consider this below.
3. False-AcquittalCosts
False acquittal occurs if firms are held not liable although they
engaged in socially harmful conduct-a conspiracy under section 1 or
monopolization under section 2-where the harm to consumers outweighs
the social benefits. Whether we are considering section 1 or section 2
violations, false acquittals generate underdeterrence costs. Firms, aware of
the likelihood that courts will err in their favor, will be less likely to take
precautions or to forbear from conduct that violates the Sherman Act.
Under both sections 1 and 2, underdeterrence costs take the particular form
of consumer surplus losses that result from monopoly prices.
Initially, the very notion of this harm has an attractive property.
Because the harm from false acquittal in antitrust cases typically is
transmitted through excessively high prices and low output, several market
forces combine to constrain false-acquittal costs in antitrust. Consider the
the defendant's litigation costs. The third factor, the prospect of a damaging adverse decision, increases
(other things being equal) the defendant's willingness to pay for his legal defense.
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false-acquittal costs associated with section 1. These costs are constrained

by the following market restraints: (1) entry, (2) competition from
incumbent firms, and (3) strategic factors.
The effect of entry is easy to understand. A successful price-fixing
cartel encourages firms on the sidelines to enter the market and to offer the
item sold by the cartel at a lower price. The ease of entry is critical to the
degree of constraint associated with this factor.12 9 In a market in which
entry is easy and likely to occur rapidly, the false acquittal costs associated
with section 1 are likely to be negligible. Of course, if entry is easy and
rapid, the cartel is unlikely to be in place long enough or to have enough
effect to be subject to suit. Still, entry must be within some parameters to
constrain the operation of cartels and, hence, the costs of false acquittals.
Competition from existing firms provides another constraint on false
acquittal costs under section 1. If there are existing firms outside of the
cartel that are operating in the same market, we should expect them to take
advantage of the cartel's output-restraining policy in order to expand their
businesses. This happened, for example, in response to formation of the
OPEC cartel. 130 Of course, it would make little sense for a cartel to form in
the presence of an obvious competitive threat. In OPEC's case, it took
several years for production by non-OPEC nations to increase sufficiently
to constrain OPEC's production and pricing flexibility. 3 ' False acquittal
in such circumstances allows above-market returns-and associated
consumer losses--during the time that it takes other firms to offset the
conspiracy-generated output reduction.
The more common scenario is one in which competition from
incumbent firms can offset production cuts more swiftly. This is likely to
lead to "limit pricing," a strategy of setting price in order to deter
expansion by incumbents (or new entry). 3 2 Suppose the existing firms are
selling the same goods, but in a geographically distinct market. They could
sell the goods in the same market as that in which the cartel operates, but129.
130.
131.

George J. Stigler, A 7heory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL EcON. 44.48 (1964).
See, e.g., ABBAS ALNASRAWI, OPEC INA CHANGING WORLD EcONO.my 7,24 (1985).
Indeed, as we were %witingthis paper, the OPEC cartel regained its stability, driving the price

of oil toward $30/barrel. See Volte Face, ECONONIST, Jan. 29, 2000. at 79 (discussing effects of
Mexican energy minister Luis Tellez's efforts to revive OPEC). Rival non-OPEC oil suppliers hale not
yet entered the market with sufficient volume to drive the price back do%%, and it may take them

several months or perhaps years to do so. Moreover, the incentive for rivals to enter is clearly
dampened by the prospect that the cartel may again lose control over the production levels of nmmbers,
causing the price to collapse.
132. On limit pricing see F1M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKEr STRUCTURE AND EcONO tc
PERFORmANcE 232-52 (2d ed. 1980).
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prior to the cartel's action-choose not to because transportation costs
prevent them from offering a competitive price. Still, the existence of these
firms puts a ceiling on the price the cartel can charge. If that ceiling
happens to be above the joint-profit-maximizing price for the cartel
(because, for example, transport costs are extremely high relative to
product value), the ceiling will not constrain the cartel. However, if it is
below the cartel's joint-profit maximizing price, it will force the cartel to
lower its price to a level just below the ceiling. Although the cartel still
operates, and still imposes losses in welfare on consumers, the losses are
constrained by the threat of expansion or entry if the cartel sets prices
above the ceiling.
The third factor constraining the underdeterrence costs associated with
false acquittals are strategicfactors. Price-fixing agreements are difficult
to maintain, given the incentive of cartel members to cheat. In addition to
this incentive, there is also the incentive on the part of cartel customers to
induce instability. Cartel customers can induce instability through several
methods. They can report cheating by one member to other members of
the cartel, thus weakening the resolve of cartel members to stick with the
price restraint.' 3 3 Unless the cartel members have a means of checking on
the validity of such reports, consumers have incentives to issue false
reports of cheating as well. Alternatively, consumers can purchase through
a single buying agent, altering the relationship into one of bilateral
monopoly. The buying agent can induce instability by encouraging
coalitions or members within the cartel to consider a separate deal.
Under section 2, the threat of entry and of competition from
incumbent firms in the industry plays a similar role. A dominant firm that
consistently charges monopoly prices will attract entrants to its market. As
with cartels, the speed of entry-and, in markets with differentiated goods,
the comparability of the entrants' products-is critical to the degree of
constraint. 13 4 Strategic factors also play a role in constraining costs if
customers seek substitute supply sources in order to make a credible threat
of breaking off business with the dominant firm.'3 5
133. Stigler, supra note 129, at 46.
134. E.g., Steven C. Salop, MeasuringEase of Entry, 31 ANTrrRUST BULL. 551,558-59 (1986).
135. For example, in Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (lst Cir. 1983), the
defendant, in order to develop an alternative source of supply for mechanical snubbers, supported the
plaintiff's entry into the market. This support included financing product development costs and a
commitment to purchase roughly $10 million worth of snubbers.
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Academic commentary in recent years has focused increasingly on the

136
ways in which decisions of firms with market power can affect rivals.
False acquittals can retard market competition in some instances, if

anticompetitive conduct that limits the prospect of successful entry or
expansion goes undeterred. For that reason, there has been special concern

over practices such as predatory pricing, which-if there is a durable
monopoly--can drive rivals from the market and then impose excessive

costs on consumers. 137 There is considerable debate, however, as to the
plausibility of the assumptions necessary to sustain predatory pricing and

similar practices.

138

4. False-ConvictionCosts

False convictions occur when a firm is convicted under the Sherman
Act even though its actions were reasonable in the sense already defined.
For purposes of section 1, we could provide a theory of reasonable pricefixing, but this is unnecessary.139 It should suffice to say that the
reasonableness standard would make some allowance for reasonable pricefixing, and probably more than the law currently allows. 140 The law
already, as we have noted, creates exceptions to the per se rule for certain
cases (for instance, the introduction of a new product, as in BMl141). In
determining the costs of false convictions, we must ask whether the per se
136.

See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation.

ProductPreannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 940 (1986); Michael H. Riordan &
Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUsT LJ. 513
(1995); Steven C. Salop, StrategicEntry Deterrence,69 AM. ECON. REV. 335 (1979).
137. See, e.g., Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 697 (1975); Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley
& Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic 77teory and Legal Policy. 88 GEO. L.J. 2239
(2000).
138. See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley & George A. Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic
Theories and the Evolution of Legal Standards,66 CORNELL L REv. 738 (1981); Avinash Dixit, Entry
and Exit Decisions Under Uncertainty, 97 J. POL ECON. 620, 620-38 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook.
PredatoryStrategies and Counter-Strategies,48 U. CtI. L REV. 263 (1981); Paul Joskow & Alvin
Kievorick, A Frameworkfor Analyzing Predatory PricingPolicy, 89 YALE LJ. 213 (1979); John S.
McGee, PredatoryPricingRevisited, 23 J.L & ECON. 289 (1980); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Limit
Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information:An Equilibrium Analysis. 50 ECONOMETRICA 443
(1982); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. EcOr.
THEORY 280 (1982); Janusz Ordover & Garth Saloner, Predation, Monopolization, and Antitrust, in 1
THE HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 538 (Richard Schmalensec & Robert D. Willig eds.,
1989); Garth Saloner, Predation,Mergers,andIncomplete Information, 18 RAND J. ECON. 165 (1937).
139. On "reasonable" price-fixing, see TEiSER, supra note 33 and Grady, supra note 33.
140. Grady, supra note 33.
141. See supranote 38 and accompanying text.
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rule's foreclosure of certain exceptions that would be available under a
general reasonableness test generates substantial overdeterrence costs.
Under section 2, false convictions generate overdeterrence costs in
several forms, depending on the type of monopolization claim. Consider,
again, the preemptive expansion claims upheld in the Alcoa opinion. False
convictions for capacity expansion deter dominant firms from making
aggressive efforts to expand into new markets or to meet increases in
demand for their products. In the latter case, if the firm is dominant in an
industry with economies of scale, a decision to forgo expansion would be
costly to the firm and to consumers. Let us call this a simple productionefficiency cost. In general, production-efficiency costs result if false
convictions cause dominant firms whose costs are lower because of scale
economies to forgo aggressive expansion efforts.
Another type of overdeterrence cost is associated with false
convictions for predatory pricing. Firms concerned about the risk of
predatory pricing charges will have an incentive to avoid aggressive price
competition, which diminishes the welfare of consumers by generating
consumer surplus losses, a cost we will call a price-efficiency cost.
The error costs associated with false convictions for monopolization
are quite plausibly broader than the two basic types of overdeterrence costs
discussed so far-production-efficiency and price-efficiency costs. False
convictions for monopolization, particularly predatory pricing, encourage
firms to seek informal agreements with their competitors. The reason for
this is simple: If competitors have no complaints at all about a dominant
firm's pricing or output decisions, they will have no incentive to seek
antitrust enforcement from the government.
Alternatively, if the
government or some third party should bring an antitrust action against a
dominant firm, then one that has formed alliances with many of its
competitors will be able to rely on their support-e.g., testifying in court in
favor of the dominant firm's conduct. Thus, false convictions for
monopolization have a multiplier effect, creating cartelizationcosts, to the
extent that they cause informal collusive arrangements to develop.
Drawing an analogy to Guido Calabresi's famous analysis of accident
costs, 142 let us define the foregoing types of costs as the primary
overdeterrence costs associatedwith false convictions for monopolization.
The overdeterrence costs associated with false convictions under section 2
142.

(1970).

See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
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are therefore production-efficiency costs, price-efficiency costs, and
cartelization costs.
In addition to these primary costs, we can identify a set of secondar.'
rent-seeking costs associated with false convictions for monopolization.
Secondary costs result from the law itself becoming a competitive
instrument, which is a problem largely unique to section 2. As a
competitive instrument, the law will be used to facilitate informal cartel
behavior among firms. Firms that try to deviate from the implicit
noncompetition norms encouraged by false convictions will be punished by
section 2 lawsuits brought by firms that comply with the norms. Thus, use
of the law as a facilitating mechanism for informal collusion generates a
distinguishable type of cost-facilitation costs-that results from firms
using the law to enforce noncompetition norms.
Another distinguishable cost is connected to the distorted view of the
section 2 standard that firms are encouraged to have. As firms tend
increasingly to use the standard in order to facilitate informal cartelization,
each firm will tend to view the lav as serving largely that purpose in the
hands of plaintiffs. This leads potential defendants to have less regard for
the standards of the law itself, which should distort their compliance
efforts, again toward informal cartelization. In other words, use of the
section 2 standard as a competitive instrument encourages demoralization
costs to the extent that reputational concerns and a belief that compliance
with a reasonable conduct rule will be rewarded are diminished as
incentives to avoid cartelization.
Finally, false convictions for monopolization generate tertiary
litigation costs connected to bad-faith litigation. Litigation is costly by
itself. However, these costs are likely to multiply as a result of the
facilitation and demoralization effects just described. As a larger number
of firms use the monopolization lawsuit as a competitive tool, firms will
find it increasingly difficult to tell whether damages are awarded
appropriately in the typical case. As firms lose faith in the ability of courts
to distinguish valid from invalid monopolization claims, their incentive
increases to bring spurious monopolization claims.' 43 Indeed, competition
143. Two notes are in order here. First, in this context, we use "spurious" to indicate suits not
based on a reasonable belief that the defendant is imposing monopoly costs on consumers. This
certainly would include suits with negative expected value, but also (if errors are sufficiently frequent
and substantial) might include positive expected value suits as well. Second, we are using the more
complex, Bayesian notion of error referred to earlier in this discussion. See supra text accompanying
note 91. The simpler error rate (the likelihood of judicial error) may be fixed at a low level. but
industry players will observe the empirical (ex post) frequency of false convictions lv.hich is a function
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would spur firms to file spurious claims since the firm that
forbears from
144
filing such claims would be at a competitive disadvantage.
One can draw an analogy here to tax cheating and bribery. As long as
the expected penalty for tax cheating-the product of the probability of
detection and the penalty-is less than the immediate gain, competition
will spur firms to cheat on their taxes; the firm that forbears from such
cheating will be undersold by its nefarious rivals. Similarly, the firm that
refuses to bribe government functionaries in a corrupt country will suffer a
competitive disadvantage relative to its rivals.145 In the same sense, if there
is a substantial probability that a false conviction for monopolization will
occur, each firm will have an incentive to file a spurious claim against a
dominant competitor as long as the expected gain-in terms of deterring
the competitive conduct of the dominant firm-exceeds the cost of
bringing suit. We should expect this incentive to increase as the perceived
probability of a false conviction increases. The logical endpoint of this
process is a state in which each firm has an incentive to seek damages from
a competitor after any event that causes a shift of business toward the
competitor.
5. ErrorCosts UnderPublic Enforcement
We have focused on the incentives of private litigants. However,
many of the error costs we have identified would be observed under a
regime of exclusively public enforcement. Experience has shown that
private parties often have input, directly or through intermediaries, on the
decisions of federal antitrust enforcers (the FTC and the Justice
Department). 14 6 Indeed, in any regime in which public antitrust enforcers
have discretion, it is difficult to see how private influence could be
eliminated.
Although the incidence of litigation would not be entirely within
private litigants' control, much of the preceding analysis would apply in a
public enforcement regime. The primary overdeterrence costs (productiveefficiency costs and price-efficiency costs) would remain, of course,
both of error and of the mix of guilty and innocent defendants) and base their views of the operative
legal standard on this measure.
144. This is true even if the suits have negative expected value in the ordinary sense, so long as
the costs associated with defending the litigation sufficiently reduce competition to compensate for the
plaintiff's expected litigation costs.
145. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q.J. ECON. 599 (1993).
146.

See, e.g., THE CAUSES

AND

CONSEQUENCES

OF ANTITRUST:

PERSPECTIVE (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shugart II eds., 1995).
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because these are due simply to the existence of a positive probability of
false conviction. The magnitude of the costs would be affected by the
probability of false conviction, which in turn would be a function of the
cases brought." 7 As a first approximation, we would expect public
enforcement to be more in line with the public interest in case selection,
though, as we show momentarily, that expectation will not necessarily
maintain.
The secondary costs that reflect rent-seeking pressures are likely to
remain in some form as well. Although it is true that public enforcers will
not respond immediately to and in perfect conformance with the wishes of
private parties, they are likely to respond at least partially to these
influences. 148 Moreover, even though the response of public enforcers will
be muted and partial, public enforcement agencies have a relatively large
budget that can be spent without an immediate concern for the financial
payoff. 149 Public enforcers' greater freedom from direct concern about
litigation costs-which creates some likelihood that a public enforcement
agency will pursue an "unremunerative" claim through the courts-also
gives private parties an incentive to lobby for public enforcement rather
than litigate their own claims. Indeed, a superior strategy is to pursue both:
to persuade the public enforcement agency to pursue an aggressive
monopolization claim first, and then to follow with a private suit for treble
damages if the public enforcement agent is successful. 150 Given this
possibility, secondary rent-seeking costs associated with public
enforcement may be even larger than those created under a purely private
enforcement regime. The same analysis raises the possibility that
aggregate litigation costs will be larger under a mixed public-private
regime than under a regime of strictly private litigation.
147. See discussion of the error probability supratext accompanying note 91.
148. Public enforcers with different political allegiances will respond differently to pleas from
specific private parties. This will affect the precise contours of public response to rent-seeking and

perhaps even the magnitude of rents generated through that response. Public action under any regimt=.
however, will be likely to support some rent-seeking, as that will be the dominant source of demands
for public action.

149.

Public enforcers do, of course, face budget constraints, and they must be concerned about the

costs and prospects for litigation. But that concern is not so immediate and direct as the concern of
private litigants, and this suggests that private parties will seek to influence public prosecutors. In
general, of course, it is not possible to know whether public enforcers will bring more or fceer suits
than private litigants or whether they will seek enforcement in more or fewer low-probability cases.
150. See e.g., Robert B. Reich, The Antitrust Induisny, 68 GEO. LJ. 1053, 1065 (1980).
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D. UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST STANDARDS

This framework for error-cost analysis can be applied to the two
important deviations from a reasonable conduct/general-intent standard
observed in antitrust: the specific-intent requirement under section 2, and
the per se rule under section 1.
1. Specific-Intent Requirement
From the foregoing, the justification for the specific-intent standard
under section 2 should be clear. The alternative to a specific-intent
requirement under section 2 is the standard articulated by Judge Hand in
Alcoa: a reasonable conduct standard coupled with a requirement of only
general-intent evidence. However, the modem section 2 case law applies a
reasonable conduct standard with a requirement of specific-intent evidence.
This effectively constrains courts in holding dominant firms liable under
section 2 only when the sole (or overwhelming) purpose or motive behind
their conduct is to monopolize or to create barriers to competition. In other
words, the requirement of specific intent implies that a dominant firm does
not violate section 2 when its actions can be characterized as a mixed sort
involving the creation of competition barriers and benefits for consumers.
Let us refer to the reasonable conduct standard coupled with a generalintent test as the Alcoa standard, and let us refer to the reasonable conduct
standard coupled with a specific-intent test as the actual standard under
section 2. Relative to an extremely accurate court (one that makes very
few mistakes), the Alcoa standard involves a high likelihood of both false
convictions and false acquittals-that is, it generates a symmetric increase
in error. For example, if courts attempt to determine whether capacityexpansion decisions were warranted by business conditions, many errors in
favor of the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff are likely. The actual
standard, compared to a low-error regime, implies a decrease in the
likelihood of false convictions and an increase in the likelihood of false
acquittals. The specific-intent test implies an asymmetric increase in error
favoring defendants.
The case for the specific-intent test is straightforward. Under the
Alcoa standard, both false convictions and false acquittals are likely to
occur. Under the actual standard, false acquittals are likely and false
convictions unlikely. If the costs associated with false convictions and
false acquittals were of equal magnitude, there would be little reason to
choose one rule over another. However, the error costs are not of equal
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magnitude. False-acquittal costs are likely smaller than those associated
with false convictions.
The reason false acquittal costs are likely to be smaller than falseconviction costs under section 2 follows from a comparison of market
Market restraints due to entry,
restraints and rent-seeking costs.
competition from incumbents, and strategic behavior of market participants
are likely to keep the costs of false acquittals under section 2 relatively
small. False-acquittal costs will be high only where the defendant has a
durable monopoly, is protected against entry, and does not fear further
litigation costs from exploiting the monopoly.' 5 1 On the other hand, false
convictions under section 2 are not constrained by similar factors. The
threat of entry as a constraining force on cartelization is weakened under a
false-convictions regime because incumbent firms can use the
monopolization lawsuit as an instrument to restrain the competitive efforts
of an entrant.
A rough, static sense of the comparative magnitudes of false-acquittal
and false-conviction costs is suggested by Arnold Harberger's analysis of
the deadweight cost of monopoly 5 2 and Gordon Tullock's analysis of the
rent-seeking costs of monopoly.' 5 3 Recall that false-acquittal costs under
section 2 are consumer- (and producer-) surplus losses that result from
monopoly pricing. Harberger's and several succeeding empirical analyses
have suggested that these costs are relatively small, gven the degree of
competition that typically exists.' 54 Harberger's results suggest that among
potential antitrust defendants who have monopoly power and have
exercised it illicitly (necessary aspects of a false acquittal), the instances in
which such power is both durable and substantial will be rare. On the other
hand, false-conviction costs are probably dominated by rent-seeking costs,
which can be approximated under Tullock's analysis by the expected
profits from monopolization. Where false-acquittal costs principally
involve the deadweight cost of a monopoly that is unchecked, falseconviction costs include the total cost of unproductive expenditures made
151. See discussionsupra text accompanying notes 129-36.
152. Arnold C. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AMi. ECON. REv. 77 (1954).
153. Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 I. ECON. J. 224
(1967).
154. Harberger, supra note 152. For the studies supporting Harberger's results, see David
Schwartzman, The Burden ofMonopoly, 68 J. POL EcoN. 627 (1960); John J. Siegfried & Thomas K.
Tiemann, The Welfare Costs of Monopoly: An Inter-Industny Analysis, 12 ECON. INQUIRY 190 (1974)
and Dean A. Worcester, Jr., New Estimates of the Welfare Loss to Monopoly. United States: 19561969,40 S. ECON. J 234 (1973).
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in pursuit of monopoly gains.' 55 In other words, while false-acquittal costs
can be represented by Harberger triangles, false-conviction costs are given
by Tullockian rectangles. Thus, in a static sense, the error costs associated
with false convictions are likely to be greater than those associated with

false acquittals for monopolization.
A dynamic view of the regime further supports the concern over falseconviction costs, as the divergence in error costs is likely to increase over
time. Changes in technology and tastes open new opportunities for firms to

enter and to steal business from dominant firms.

Transportation and

communication costs fall over time, enabling firms in formerly distinct
markets to compete. These factors reduce the costs of false acquittals-the
costs of monopolization-toward zero in the long run; that is at least the
historical record of entry, competition, and technological change.' 56 On the
other hand, where false convictions are frequent, monopolization costs are
likely to "ratchet up" over time. The prospect of false convictions not only

deters vigorous competition but also provides noncompeting firms an
effective tool-the attempted monopolization lawsuit-to constrain
competition from noncooperating incumbents and potentially successful
15 7

entrants.

The best analogy to the likely outcome of a regime with substantial
numbers of false convictions is suggested by the regulation of taxicabs.
Under medallion regimes, incumbent taxicab firms have an incentive to
155. Rent-seeking will not be a one-way street. Potential defendants as well as potential
beneficiaries of antitrust litigation will make "directly unproductive" expenditures aimed at influencing
public authorities. So far as potential defendants' expenditures contribute to false acquittal or to
nonprosecution, these impose costs that are in some respects similar to competitors' expenditures in
pursuit of convictions (though constrained by the market restraints identified supra Part II.C.3). Not
all of the lobbying expenditures by potential defendants, however, should be classified as false-acquittal
costs. Apart from the fact that some proportion of expenditures for both potential defendants and
potential beneficiaries of antitrust litigation will be congruent with social good, defendants'
expenditures aimed at influencing public decisionmakers are likely to increase along with the prospect
of false conviction. See Fred McChesney, Rent Extraction and Interest-Group Organization in a
Coasean Model of Regulation, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 73 (1991); Fred McChesney, Rent Extraction and
Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987). Moreover, since
defendants will have an incentive to match the lobbying efforts of potential plaintiffs, directly
unproductive expenditures are considerably more likely to spiral upward under the false-convictions
regime.
156. See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION
IN AMERICAN BustNEss 188-239 (1977) (discussing economic impact of transportation and
communication revolutions of the nineteenth century).
157. To be sure, there will be market pressures to reduce costs through development of substitutes
for goods or services whose efficient provision is constrained by fear of litigation. But these mitigating
factors do not alter the fundamental problem-that the false-convictions regime encourages
unproductive rent-seeking investments.
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prevent entry from new competitors, and seek to prevent entry by lobbying
municipal governments to enforce taxi regulations. Moreover, incumbent
firms have typically made heavy investments based on their expectations of
retaining some degree of monopoly power, and understand that
maintenance of entry restrictions is necessary if the firms are to break even
on their investments. 158 A similar scenario is likely to be observed in a
regime of false convictions for monopolization. Firms that have made
investments based on the expectation that entrants would not take business
from them will have incentives to use the monopolization lawsuit in order
159
to protect their investments.
In view of this, the specific-intent standard probably serves the
function of reducing expected error costs associated with the reasonable
conduct rule under section 2 by helping eliminate false convictions. Again,
in an ideal, error-free world, the Alcoa standard (general intent coupled
with reasonableness test) could be applied in a manner that maximized
social welfare. However, in a regime in which mistakes are likely to occur,
the Alcoa standard is likely to perform poorly.
In addition to providing a positive theory of the specific-intent test,
error-cost analysis provides suggestions as to the specific form of the test.
An intent inquiry can be framed either as a subjective or as an objective
inquiry. Under a subjective inquiry, specific intent could be established by
evidence suggesting that the defendant had a desire to gain monopoly
power or to restrict competition. Thus, a defendant could be found in
violation of section 2 even though his conduct provided substantial benefits
to consumers, as long as the plaintiff could show that he really wanted to
gain monopoly power. Corporate memoranda with statements such as
"we'll destroy our competitors with this new product enhancement," would
be indicators of specific intent under a subjective inquiry.
158. See, e.g., RONALD A. CASS, COLIN S. Dnv.R & JACK M. BEERMANN. ADMIvtISTRATIVE
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1021-22 (3d ed. 1998); Edmund W. Kitch. Marc Isaacson & Daniel
Kasper, The Regulation of Taxicabs in Chicago, 14 J.L & ECON. 285 (1971).
159. One might ask why these are not sunk costs, in the sense that the firms have incurred them in

the past, and should no longer take them into account in making decisions. But %Nhenfirms have made
investments in securing a legal framework that protects them from competition, their future profits
depend on the maintenance of their protective framework. Hence, they will have an incentive to

continue to invest in the maintenance of a legally protective framework. To take a more concrete
example, return to the taxicab medallions. The medallion is an asset--the most important asset owned
by taxi drivers and companies-whose value is substantially determined by the degree of protection

from competition. The market value of the medallion is the presented discounted value of the stream of
profits accring to the medallion owner. Medallion owvners know that future protection from entry
increases the expected future stream of profits and also the current value of the medallion. See CASS ET
AL, supranote 158, at 1021-22.
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Under an objective inquiry, specific intent is inferred largely from
evidence negating the likelihood of any other motive. Thus, under an
objective inquiry, a defendant whose actions produce benefits to consumers
in addition to potential barriers to competition would be an unlikely
candidate for a finding of specific intent.
We doubt whether a subjective-intent test can be applied in a
predictable fashion in a field such as antitrust, where all defendants seek to
increase profits, typically through strategies that require a gain in market
share. Given the difficulty of drawing distinctions on the basis of
subjective intent, such a test is likely to operate in effect as a randomly
applied strict liability rule. If the subjective intent is inferred largely from
statements of business strategy under ordinary civil proof standards, the
overdeterrence costs associated with false convictions should be at least as
160
large in this regime as under the reasonable conduct standard.
2. Per Se Rule
The foregoing analysis would seem to suggest that the per se rule
against price-fixing should be abandoned in favor of a reasonable conduct
test. False-acquittal costs under section 1 are, like those under section 2,
constrained by the threat of entry, competition from incumbent firms, and
strategic behavior by consumers. If false-acquittal costs were the most
important components of an error-cost analysis, this would be the
unavoidable conclusion. But this is an incomplete analysis.
Though false-acquittal costs are constrained both under section 1 and
under section 2 by market forces, false-conviction costs are subject to
different pressures under the two provisions. The key difference is that the
rent-seeking costs generated by the prospect of false convictions under
section 2 are not observed in similar measure under section 1. Firms would
not have incentives to use section 1 as a competitive tool in the same way
as they might use section 2. Collusive behavior under section 1 tends
either to include firms that otherwise might compete or to provide an
umbrella over less-efficient competitors. The victims who would bring suit
under section 1 typically are not the competitors of the defendant; they are
suppliers or customers. 6 1 In this capacity, they would have no interest in
160. Of course, various alterations to the subjective-intent test-such as specifying a more precise
and limited object for the intent requirement or raising the evidentiary bar-could reduce false
convictions and overdeterrence costs. Such changes also could be made in other intent tests.
161. Law firms specializing in class-action litigation could engage in rent-seeking activities even
though the consumers on whose behalf they (ostensibly) sue could not. There appears to be some
evidence of rent-seeking by such lawyers, though it seems targeted more generally at preventing
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using the section 1 action as a tool for gaining a competitive advantage, nor
would they face competitive pressure to use section 1 in this manner.
Moreover, while section 2 (with false convictions) can be used by an
incumbent firm to restrain competition from any substantial competitor,
section 1 can be used (also with false convictions) only against firms that
form a potentially collusive group. In addition, the scope for standing is so
much broader under section 2 than under section 1 that it is difficult to
imagine firms using section 1 as a competitive instrument. The result is
that false-conviction costs under section 1 are not subject to the Tullockian
rent-seeking pressures observed under section 2.
This is not to say that there will not be false-conviction costs under
section 1, for there are several such costs under the current regime. First,
the per se rule itself obviously generates false convictions, since a welfaremaximizing, error-free regime would apply a reasonable conduct standard.
Of course, as we have noted before, the per se rule contains exceptions
(such as BM1), and in view of this, the relevant question is whether the
false convictions generated under the per se rule with its current exceptions
are substantial. Second, public enforcement agents bring many of the
section 1 actions, and the incentives of these agents may diverge from those
of an enforcer who is devoted to maximizing social welfare. In particular,
public enforcement agents may have career interests that drive them to
pursue doubtful applications of the law.1 62 However, these costs are not
fueled by the same wellspring of self-interest as those generated under
section 2.
The other major difference between section 1 and section 2 is that
while competence (or the lack of it) would be a major factor generating
error under a reasonable conduct standard for section 2, the private
information problem is probably the more serious source of error under a
reasonable conduct test for section 1. This is evident when viewed in light
of the history of price-fixing law. Before the Sherman Act, a price-fixing
issue entered the courts only on the occasion when a cartel member refused
to participate and the other cartel members sued on breach-of-contract
grounds. Courts refused to enforce agreements to restrain trade that they
deemed unreasonable. The courts applied a reasonable conduct test to
changes in the class-action litigation process than at securing government cooparation in particular

antitrust actions. The reason for this may be the lawyers' inability to secure effective poperty rights in
litigation ex ante in the same manner as competitors whose status as parties in interest cannot be
supplanted readily by other firms.
162. E.g., Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Connission. 37 U. CmI. L RE%. 47. 82-87
(1969).
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price-fixing and generated an elaborate doctrine governing contract in
restraint of trade.
If common law courts, well before the Sherman Act, were capable of
analyzing price-fixing claims, how could it be that courts would have such
a difficult time with similar claims after the passage of the Sherman Act?
The answer is that before the Sherman Act, courts confronted the pricefixing issue only when one of the parties refused to participate. In the
ensuing contract-breach action, the parties in court were all extremely
knowledgeable of the reasons and motivations behind their agreement. The
defendant could offer credible testimony as to whether the horizontal
agreement had economically justifiable motives or whether it was an effort
to gouge consumers. In this setting, courts were given enough information
to assess the credibility of the alternative theories of price-fixing offered by
the plaintiff and the defendant.
Under the Sherman Act, we have a different scenario. Here we see a
public enforcement agent prosecuting a group of firms who have formed a
cartel. Unless one of the members of the cartel discloses the true nature of
the agreement, the Sherman Act plaintiff and the court face an enormous
disadvantage. The disadvantage is not attributable to the competence of the
court; it is attributable to the private information held by the cartel. The
real reasons and motivations behind the horizontal conspiracy are known
by the cartel members, and they have a potentially decisive advantage in
obtaining and producing evidence to support their arguments.
Given that it is primarily private information held by defendants rather
than competence that generates error under section 1, false acquittals must
be viewed as considerably more likely than false convictions.
Consequently, the expected costs of false acquittals under section 1 should
be adjusted upward to reflect the private-information problem.
Putting the pieces together, error-cost analysis suggests the arguments
favoring a high burden against plaintiffs under section 2 do not suggest the
same burden under section 1. First, under a reasonable conduct standard,
false-conviction costs are likely to be smaller under section 1 than under
section 2. Second, under the same standard, false-acquittal costs are likely
to be higher under section 1 than under section 2. These factors obviously
support the per se rule.
We have noted
otherwise known as
cases of facilitating
permitted plaintiffs

that the strict-conduct-plus-general-intent test that is
the per se rule has been relaxed in the two special
practices and conscious parallelism. Courts have
to prevail in some of these cases with only
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circumstantial evidence-that is, with evidence falling short of proving
general intent to conspire with respect to price. The analysis here shows
that these special cases should be understood as error-cost-minimizing
responses to the private-information problem. Where the conditions
indicate that the likelihood of price-fixing is very high, courts have
effectively shifted the burden on general intent to the defendants. When
defendants have the evidence in their hands, and the circumstantial
evidence indicates guilt, shifting the burden reduces the likelihood of error

by giving the informed party an incentive to reveal his information to the
court. In this sense, the special and rather narrow exceptions created for
plaintiffs in facilitating practice and conscious parallelism cases are
analogous to the res ipsa rule in tort law, which shifts the burden of proof
to the tort defendant in cases where the circumstantial evidence indicates
163
negligence.
IV. THE CONTROVERSY OVER INTENT IN ANTITRUST

As we noted earlier, definition of the intent standard has been
controversial in antitrust law, particularly in monopolization disputes. A
number of law-and-economics scholars have suggested that intent should
play no role at all in antitrust analysis, which is the position that Judge
Hand took in Alcoa. 164 A minority of antitrust commentators have argued,
163. Note that error-cost analysis provides a justification for the per se rule that would otherwise
be harder to construct under the traditional deterrence analysis used to justify strict liability rules in tort
law. Under the traditional deterrence analysis in tort law, strict liability is appropriate in some areas
even if courts operate without error. Under one version of deterrence analysis, strict liability is applied
in order to reduce the scale of activities when shutting down an activity is a more effective vay of
reducing harm than is controlling instantaneous precaution. See LANDES & POS'ER, supra note 83. at
70. Another version of deterrence analysis holds that strict liability is applied in order to reduce the
scale of activities when the externalized costs associated with the activity are substantially greater than
the externalized benefits. See Hylton, supra note 87, at 986. This is true, for example. of blasting.
which even if operated under reasonable care, is likely to impose substantial costs and only minor
benefits on adjacent landowners.
It is not clear that deterrence analysis can provide a compelling account for the per se rule in
antitrust. A cartel can act in a manner that, from a social welfare persp-ctive, is unreasonable, for
instance where its horizontal agreement is designed to generate monopoly profits and is able to do so.
But cartels also can act reasonably from a social welfare perspective, engaging in cooperative activity
that enhances social welfare. See Grady, supra note 33. Reasonable cartel behavior does not expose
consumers to any special risks. Common law courts for many years applied a reasonable conduct test
to horizontal agreements, see id., even while applying strict liability tests to nuisances in the tort law.
164. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 431-32. On the case against intent, see A.A. Poulty Famts, Inc. v. Rose.
Acre Farm, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1989). in which Judge Easterbrook held that specific
intent is immaterial in predatory pricing cases. See also Barry Wright Corp. v. 17T Grinnell Corp., 724
F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer, J., holding that subjective intent is irrelevant). PosN n. supra
note 66, at 190 (arguing that any doctrine that relies on proof of intent will be applied erratically at
best); Franklin M. Fisher, Matsushita: Myth -.
Analysis in the Economics of Predation.64 Cti.-KEs.'r L
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at the other extreme, that intent should be determined either wholly or in
165
part by a subjective inquiry.
Perhaps the individual who best illustrates the controversy is Professor
Franklin Fisher, the lead economic expert for IBM during the litigation of
United States v. IBM and later the lead economic expert for the
Government in the Microsoft litigation. During the IBM litigation, Fisher

perceptively noted that the intent issue had taken on an unjustifiably large
degree of importance in antitrust litigation and argued that it should be
deemed irrelevant under the monopolization standard. 166 During the
Microsoft case, however, Fisher argued that memoranda and other internal
communications from Microsoft officers and employees that could be read
as suggesting an anticompetitive intent supplied the critical evidence that
Microsoft's actions were not competitive acts but instead were violations of

section

2.167

The Microsoft litigation serves to illustrate the problems that would be
generated under either of the two extreme approaches to intent (general
versus subjective) suggested by antitrust commentators. As we suggested
in Part II of this Article, antitrust courts have for the most part avoided
reliance on the subjective-intent test and moved increasingly toward
adopting a specific-intent requirement under section 2. In other words, of
the three approaches to intent observed in the law, (1) general intent;
(2) specific intent determined by a subjective inquiry; and (3) specific
intent determined by an objective inquiry, courts have gravitated toward the
REV. 969, 969-70 (1988); David McGowan, Networks and Intention in Antitrust and Intellectual
Property Law, 24 J. CORP. L. 485, 513 (1999); Michael C. Quinn, PredatoryPricing Strategies: The
Relevance of Intent Under Antitrust, Unfair Competition, and Tort Law, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 607
(1990).
165. See Gifford, supra note 2, at 1021-23 (arguing that subjective intent resolves ambiguities
surrounding defendant's conduct); Will Wachs, The Microsoft Antitrust Litigation: In the Name of
Competition, 30 U. TOL. L. REv. 485, 498-99 (1999) (arguing that Microsoft's conduct should be
judged in light of the subjective-intent evidence). In William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT
Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), which held that subjective-intent evidence is
material, the Ninth Circuit cited Richard Markovits in support of its proposition that the "rational
expectations of the monopolist" should be consulted in order to help determine whether his conduct
violated the Sherman Act. Id. 1034 & n.28 (citing Richard Markovits, Some PreliminaryNotes on the
Antitrust Laws' Economic Tests of Legality, 27 STAN. L. REV. 841 (1975)). However, it is unclear
whether Markovits thought that rational expectations are equivalent to subjective intent. A firm's
rational expections as to the outcome of an action could easily differ from its subjective intent.
166. See, e.g., FISHER ET AL., supranote 3, at 271-72.
167. See Fisher Direct, supranote 2, at 62-67. We do not intend our remarks to be understood as
a criticism of Professor Fisher. Indeed, that an economist of his caliber would take different views of
the intent issue in different cases should be understood as an indication of the issue's complexity. For
Fisher's own description of his views in the IBM and Microsoft cases, see Franklin M. Fisher, The IBM
and Microsoft Cases: What's the Difference?,90 AM. ECON. REV. 180 (2000).
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objective specific-intent test. The Microsoft litigation provides a good
illustration of the reasons for rejecting the alternatives to the objective
specific-intent test.

A. GENERAL INTENT AND MICROSOFT
The case brought by the U.S. Department of Justice against Microsoft
Corporation turns on Microsoft's actions that generally had two effects:
they reduced the cost of consumer access to software features integrated
into Microsoft's Windows operating system for personal computers, and at
the same time made it more difficult for competitors to compete with
Microsoft.
Microsoft integrated its Internet Explorer web-browser
technology into Windows rather than selling it solely on a stand-alone
basis. That decision increased consumer access to browsing software and
reduced the cost of such software, but it also cut into the profitability of
competitors' efforts to sell software performing similar web-browsing
functions.
The question for the courts is what standard should be applied in
evaluating the challenged actions. Our focus below is not on the details or
the outcome of the Microsoft case, but on the general issue of the
appropriate legal test to be applied in this case and in others with similar
issues.
1. The Argumentfor GeneralIntent
Steve Salop and Craig Romaine urge that the question-in the
Microsoft litigation specifically and in other antitrust cases more
generally-should be answered by applying a general-intent standard to a
reasonable conduct test. Salop and Romaine use their own error-cost
analysis to support this argument. In their view, a specific-intent
requirement would lead to too many errors in favor of defendants. A
reasonable-conduct-plus-general-intent test, however, would give courts
discretion, according to Salop and Romaine, to trade off false-conviction
costs against false-acquittal costs in a manner that leads to the minimization
168
of overall error costs.
In their analysis, Salop and Romaine often refer to a simple
hypothetical to support their case for the reasonableness-plus-general-intent
standard. In the hypothetical, a dominant firm enhances its product. The
product enhancement, however, has the effect of making it more difficult
168.

Salop & Romaine, supra note 3. at 660-65.
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for rivals to compete. As Salop and Romaine put this hypothetical
example:
[S]uppose that the efficiency benefit involves improved performance of
the product. Suppose that it were known that the improved product
performance has a value to users of $5. To make the example extreme in
order to illustrate the differences among alternative antitrust approaches,
suppose further that the higher barriers to competition [resulting from the
product improvement] were known to allow the monopolist to charge an

additional $50.169
Salop and Romaine argue that in this hypothetical case the antitrust
court comparing the consumer benefits to the consumer harms should hold
the firm in violation of section 2. They assert that a reasonable-conductplus-general-intent test would allow courts to maximize consumer welfare
170
and, thus, to operate an antitrust regime with minimal error.
2. ErrorCosts of General Intent Versus Specific Intent
Our argument has been the opposite of that put forward by Salop and
Romaine. We have urged that in many circumstances denying courts
discretion will minimize overall error costs. That has been the apparent
function of the specific-intent test in antitrust law and in the common law
generally. Salop and Romaine, however, believe that it is wiser to give
courts maximum discretion, so that they will be free to reach decisions that
maximize consumer welfare. The logical extreme of Salop and Romaine's
argument would leave antitrust courts unconstrained by legal doctrine and
17 1
simply charged with the duty to maximize consumer welfare.
The Salop and Romaine hypothetical properly puts in issue the
difference between two standards. Under a specific-intent requirement,
there is a substantial probability that the judge in their hypothetical would
find that the dominant firm did not violate section 2. The case for
acquitting the dominant firm would be greater, of course, if we changed the
numbers so that the new value to consumers is $20 and the price
enhancement $30 instead of $5 and $50. However, even in their
169. Id. at 646.
170. Id. at 646-53.
171. Although readers might take the point to be a mere rhetorical exercise-the reducio ad
absurdum of a moderate position-academic legal scholars often suggest commitment of a similarly
radical discretion to courts, especially in constitutional adjudication. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 98-99 (1991); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE
JUDICIARY (1982); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703
(1975).

20011

ANTITRUST INTENT

hypothetical as stated, it is not evident that the objective evidence indicates
specific intent to harm competition. Specific intent is an appropriate
finding when the evidence suggests that harming competition is the most
probable motivation behind the dominant firm's conduct. In the Salop and
Romaine hypothetical, however, there is not clear support for such a
finding. Unlike in Aspen Skiing or Lorain Journal,the Salop and Romaine
case is not one in which the dominant firm cannot put forward any credible
efficiency justification whatsoever for its conduct.
Their hypothetical, thus, questions the use of the error-costminimizing standard. Salop and Romaine argue that the proper standard is
the one that allows judges in each individual case to assess whether social
costs net positive or negative from the particular acts challenged under the
antitrust laws. The general-intent standard would allow that; the specificintent standard would not. This does not mean that the specific-intent
standard would prevent courts from deciding cases in line with social
welfare, much less that the specific-intent standard would produce overall
results further from social welfare. We believe that the opposite is the case.
The difference is our evaluation of the likelihood that courts will err in
making these determinations, that litigation will be used strategically more
often under the general-intent standard, and that the constraints imposed by
market forces will limit the ill effects of acquittals more than those of
convictions. Returning to the analysis of Part II, acquittal costs in antitrust
monopolization cases are constrained by the threat of entry from new firms,
competition from incumbents, and strategic responses of consumers.
Consider first the strategic responses of consumers. In the Salop and
Romaine hypothetical a dominant firm-let us assume it is a software
firm-enhances its softvare in a manner that produces a benefit of $5 and
raises its price by $50. What would a rational consumer do? The
consumer has several options. The most obvious is to stick with the old
version of the software. After all, the old version is inferior in terms of
value by only $5, and it is cheaper by $50. Because the "consumer
surplus," the gap between value and price, is $45 greater for the old
version, the old version is economically superior to the new one. In a
market in which all consumers are informed and rational, they will stick
with the economically superior product rather than purchase an inferior
new version.
One of the constraints software makers face is the durability of their
own products. Generally, product durability is a constraining factor for
firms with monopoly power. According to the famous "Coase conjecture,"
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a monopolist who produces a highly durable product will be forced, in a
sense, to charge the competitive price. 172 With a durable product,
consumers have the option of waiting until the monopolist can sell only to
low-valuing customers. Knowing that the monopolist would prefer to
make those sales rather than to forgo them, consumers will wait, forcing
173
the monopolist to lower its price to the competitive level.
The Salop and Romaine hypothetical is one in which the cost of
waiting is not simply low; it is negative-consumers should find it highly
beneficial to wait, given that the old version of the product is superior. At a
minimum, if consumers are rational they will not rush to the store to
purchase the new product unless the net benefits of switching to the new
version are positive. The test here is not simply whether the new product is
in some way more valuable than the old product standing alone. The gain
from switching to the new version must exceed the sum of the price of the
new version and the costs incurred in learning how to use it. This
calculation must include the loss of benefits from investments previously
made in mastering the old version. 174 Given the benefits of waiting (or
credibly threatening to wait), consumers will also demand that the new
product's benefits exceed the gains they forgo by not waiting.
Another factor constraining false acquittals is competition from
incumbent firms in the market. Beyond the immediate term, the decision
modeled in the Salop and Romaine hypothetical will produce supplymarket changes that provide additional alternatives to consumers. The
dominant firm's decision to charge a premium of $45 over the added
consumer value of its new software is an open invitation for competing
firms to offer consumers an economically superior product. Unless the
dominant firm in their hypothetical is insulated from competition to a
degree rarely seen in mature markets such as that for software, gouging its
customers will erode its market over time.
172. R.H. Coase, Durabilityand Monopoly, 15 J.L. & EcON. 143 (1972). See also Jeremy Bulow,
Durable-GoodsMonopolists, 90 J. POL. ECON. 314 (1982); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Eric Rasmusen &
J. Mark Ramseyer, The Leasing Monopolist, 37 UCLA L. REV. 693, 693-97 (1990).
173. But see Eric B. Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer & John S. Wiley, Jr., Naked Exclusion, 81 Am.
ECON. REv. 1137 (1991) (suggesting that under certain conditions it is possible for the leasing
monopolist to charge supra-competitive prices).
174. Of course, someone who is new to the product group will have less to gain from the prior
version-having nothing to gain from prior investments in mastering it-and, thus, might find it
advantageous to shift when someone earlier to the product group would not. Apart from the effect of
network externalities, discussed below, this is not a significant fact. It should not affect the actions of
other consumers. They still benefit from passing up the new product, waiting for a product that is
higher in benefit or lower in price or both.
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The third factor constraining false-acquittal costs is entry. Some
commentary suggests that entry is difficult in the software industry, as
firms must incur significant start-up costs in design, production, and
marketing. 175 Large up-front investment often is described as constituting
a "barrier to entry" into an industry. 176 Whether the need for such
investment, however, in fact discourages entry depends upon the magnitude
of the start-up costs in relation to the potential gains from successful entry
and upon the availability of financing to support investment. With wellfunctioning capital markets, even risky ventures requiring up-front
investment will be undertaken if the expected return is sufficient to justify
it. That is true even if the venture is unlikely to turn a profit for some time,
as is quite evident today from the explosion in new Internet-based firms. It
seems improbable that the software industry, built more around brainpower
than around large factories and expensive physical components, would
have difficulty attracting entrants when entry is economically justified.
If a dominant firm charges a large premium for a new product, as
Salop and Romaine hypothesize, and if incumbent firms cannot provide
suitable alternatives, there is ample room for consumers and potential
entrants to make common cause. Consumers-or intermediaries who serve
their interests, where consumers are too numerous and have individual
interests in the product that are too small for individual bargaining-have
incentives to provide guarantees to entrants who can supply a superior
product. A large firm, for example, may be able to distribute such large
quantities of software internally that it could support an entrant who offers
a product superior to that of the dominant firm. 177 Or a firm might produce
a product to which the software is complementary, and thus have a special
178
incentive to support development of a superior alternative.
175. See, e.g., Teague L Donahey, Terminal Railroad Revisited: Using the Essential Facilities
Doctrine to EnsureAccessibility to Internet Software Standards,25 AIPLA QJ. 277. 293 (1997) ("For
example, to create from scratch a new browser-based operating system that could compete with
Microsoft or Netscape, it would require unusual and significant technical expertise, as %ell as

substantial time and money.").
176. JoE S. BAiN, BARRIERS TO Nrw COMPETITION: THEIR CHARAC'ER AND CONSEQMECES IN
MANuFACrTRNG INMUsTRIES 144-66 (1956); A. Michael Spence, Entry CapaciO; lnestment and
OligopolisticPricing,8 BEL.J. ECON. 534, 542 (1977).
177. Again, recall the example from Barty Wright Corp., discussed supra note 135, in vhich the
defendant incurred substantial expenses in supporting the plaintiff's entry into the market, solely for the
purpose of creating an alternative source of supply.
178. The large number of established firms in the software industry and the constant emergence of
new firms supports the view that economically justified entry--entry by firms that can produce

software that performs competitively with incumbent software at a cost competitive with the price
charged by incumbent firMs-is likely. See, e.g., PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS, 1999 SOFTWARE

Busmss PRACnCES SuRVEY REsuLTs (May 1999), http://pwcsofLcomnpwsoft/

pract.htn.
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3. The Role of Network Externalities
Before finally rejecting the general-intent standard promoted by Salop
and Romaine, we should consider an argument pressed by proponents of
using antitrust law to regularize competition in the software industry: that
the costs of false acquittals are especially high where firms benefit from
network effects (or externalities). 17 9
The argument relies on the
proposition that in such settings consumers do not behave in quite the same
way as they do in other settings, so that in the Salop and Romaine
hypothetical, for instance, consumers may switch to the new version even
though it is economically inferior. 180 If, because of network externalities,
consumers are "locked in" to the dominant brand, false-acquittal costs are
likely to be relatively high and perhaps unconstrained by market pressures.
If the network "lock-in" theory were valid, it obviously would tilt our
analysis in favor of the general-intent standard. However, we do not think
the theory is valid.
Network externalities are, roughly, benefits consumers enjoy because
the product is used widely. Consider a software product that facilitates
communication (or file sharing) between users. Because of the large base
of customers, users know that they can communicate easily with other
users of the same software. If the value of such communication is high
enough, the number of other users becomes a critical determinant in
consumer choice. Thus, if each consumer thinks that most other consumers
will switch to the new version in the Salop and Romaine hypothetical, they
may all switch to the new version even though it is economically inferior to
the old one. Switching to the new version is rational in order to avoid
network exclusion costs.
There are several empirical issues raised by this theory. Network
effects do, of course, exist; they explain a great deal of the tendency of one
technical standard to dominate in many technologies, including those
critical to the widespread use of computers. 18' But it is doubtful that they
would cause rational consumers to choose economically inferior
179. Several commentators have examined network effects and antitrust. See, e.g., David A.
Balto, Netvorks and Exclusivity: Antitrust Analysis to Promote Network Competition, 7 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 523 (1999); Salop & Romaine, supra note 3; Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network Industries, 7
GEO. MASON L. REv. 673 (1999); David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, A Guide to the Antitrust
Economics of Netvorks, ANTtTRUST, Spring 1996, at 36.
180. For a rigorous exploration of the implications of this assumption, see Joseph Farrell &
Michael Katz, The Effects of Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law on Compatibility and Innovation,
43 ANTITRUST BULL. 609 (1998).
181.
See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 179, at 38.
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products-for example, to spend an additional $50 on a product that has a
marginal value of only $5.182 And, if the gap between networkindependent value and price is so large as in the Salop and Romaine
hypothetical, it is unlikely that consumers would either expect other
consumers to flock to the new version or gain enough value to raise their
own utility past the increased price.

The empirical evidence suggests that consumer decisions are not so
strongly influenced by network effects.

Liebowitz and Margolis have

found that consumer software purchases can be explained largely by
quality (as defined by the assessments of experts) rather than the herding
behavior induced by network externalities. 183 They find that this result
holds for a considerable array of software products. 184
Perhaps, however, network effects dominate consumer purchase
decisions in a segment of the software market. The Microsoft litigation
might be characterized as involving the segment of that market-the
platform segment-that is most sensitive to network effects. A software

platform contains application program interfaces (API's), which allow
other software to use parts of the computer's operating system to access
182. Suppose we have two groups of consumers. current users and newcomers, and current users
of software have a disincentive to switch that is not shared by consumers who are newcomers to the
market. In this case, the newcomers might be inclined to purchase new software that has net costs to
current users. That is, the product in the Salop-Romaine hypothetical might have a net economic cost to
users of the current version of this software but a net economic benefit to newcomers. If that is so,
current users must take account of the benefit they derive from being on the same system as the
newcomers. This benefit could be enough to induce them to switch even if changing to the new
This might
software did not make economic sense apart from the expected actions of other consumern.
be especially plausible in a case where current user demands are heavily affected by their expectations
regarding the choices of newcomers.
This wrinkle on the network-effects argument lends weight to the concerns of the network-effects
theorists. On inspection, however, it turns out to be the same as the basic network-effects case. In a
market without special impediments to the dissemination of information (and no one has suggested that
there is a problem getting information about the software market), newcomers will know that current
users have no reason to switch to the new version of the software in question. If there are substantial
network effects, the newcomers will demand to be provided the older version of the softw-are. That is
especially likely if there is a very large group of current users. If there are relatively few current users
and many newcomers, the network effects could work in the other direction. But that would be a
setting quite different from what Salop and Romaine postulate; it would be a setting in which the typical
user found the new softvare economically advantageous, not dramatically disadvantageous. E~en in
this setting, the current users would not switch unless the benefits, including network effect benefits,
would dominate the costs.
183. See STAN J. LIEBoivnZ & STEPHEN MARGOLIS, VINNERS, LOSERS & MtCROSOFr:
COMPETON AND ANTITRUST INHIGH TECHNOLOGY 135-57 (1999).
184. In addition to web-browsing software, Liebowitz and Margolis examine competition in vordprocessing and spreadsheet programs, personal finance software, desktop publishing soft%ar, and online services. See id. at 163-229.
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files or to utilize links to hardware such as printers. Applications software
(such as word processors, spreadsheets, and games) typically is written for
a specific software platform. If network effects are much stronger for
platform software, does this alter our conclusion that the market will
restrain the costs of false acquittals? In other words, if the Salop and
Romaine hypothetical expressly addressed Microsoft's operating system,
would market forces then be beside the point? We doubt it.
Even in the presence of strong network effects, market forces should
continue to constrain the costs of erroneous acquittals under section 2.
After all, the consumer loyalty caused by network effects is, by hypothesis,
due to a rational belief on the part of consumers that present dominance
implies future dominance. The network "lock-in" theory does not require
consumers to be irrational or uninformed as to the quality of the products
on the market; if they were irrational or uninformed, then network effects
would have only marginal relevance to the problem. If consumers are
informed, then an incentive always remains for them to switch to a superior
product whenever they can avoid network exclusion costs.
There are many ways to avoid network exclusion costs. For example,
in the case of a large employer, much of the communication relevant to an
employee's work may take place inside the firm. In this case, if the
network exclusion costs are negligible, the firm should choose the superior
software product or stick with the old version. 185 Alternatively, in many
industries, virtually all of the interchange relevant for work takes place
among the firms in the self-same industry or a subset of these firms.
Consider, for example, law professors. Almost all of the collaboration for
which network effects are relevant involves other law professors or other
lawyers. Law professors or lawyers ought to be able at low cost to
communicate with one another about the quality of products relevant to
their profession, including the benefits of continuing to use an older version
instead of a newer, but economically inferior, version of software. Indeed,
trade journals routinely contain reviews of and advice about software
relevant to lawyers' work. 18 6 The journals review specialty software (for
185. In any choice of software, the firm will consider costs, such as retraining costs, that might be
reduced by following along with other firms' software choices. Retraining costs often are
underestimated by casual observers. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Copyright, Licensing and the "First
Screen", 5 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 35, 59-61 (1999), available at http://www.mttlr.org/
volfive/cass.pdf. In the short run, of course, there are no retraining costs involved in staying with the
current software.
186. Examples of such publications include Law Office Computing, a bimonthly magazine
reviewing, among other things, software for lawyers, and Law PracticeManagement, a bimonthly ABA
publication with Technology Update and New Products sections in every issue.
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tasks such as litigation management) and general interest software (wordprocessing, spreadsheet, and similar software), and they also inform readers
about new versions of platform software, reviewing various changes in
operating systems. 187 Communication about software, including platform
softvare, can provide excellent signals about the likely decisions of other
professionals, and such signaling can make the probability of globally
irrational group decisions-decisions driven by fear of the costs of network
exclusion-arbitrarily small.
B. MICROSOFT, REASONABLE CONDUCT, AND ERROR CONSTRAINTS
To this point we have sugrested that the operating system software
market is no different from many other markets in the sense that the threat
of entry, competition from rivals, and strategic actions of consumers all
constrain the power of dominant firms to exercise monopoly power. The
network-effects phenomenon introduces a feature that arguably requires a
more careful examination of error costs in the Microsoft case. Kenneth J.
Arrow's affidavit (on behalf of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division)
in an earlier iteration of the Microsoft litigation provides an excellent
starting point for an analysis of error costs:
[The software market is peculiarly characterized by increasing returns to
scale and therefore natural barriers to entry. Large-scale operation is
low-cost operation and also conveys advantages to the buyer. Virtually
all the costs of production are in the design of the software and therefore
independent of the amount sold, so that marginal costs are virtually zero.
There are also fixed costs in the need to risk large amounts of capital and
the costs associated with developing a reputation as a quality supplier.
Further, there are network externalities, in particular, the importance of
an established product with a large installed base and the related
advantage of a product that is compatible with complementary
applications.
Installed base generally refers to the number of active users of a
particular software product. A software product with a large installed
base has several advantages relative to a new entrant. Consumers know
that such a product is likely to be supported by the vendor with upgrades
and service. Users of a product with a large installed base are more
likely to find that their products are compatible with other products....
The value of an operating system is in its capability to run application
187.

See e.g., G. Burgess Allison, World-Class Innovation and Century-ClassHeadaches, 26 L

PRAc. MGMr., Jan.Feb. 2000, at 14, 18-19 (discussing software platform); DecisionQuest'sCaseSoft

Division Releases CaseMap 2.5, LAw. COMPEIMVE EDGE, Aug. 1999. at 14 (discussing litigation
management software).
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software. The larger the installed base of a particular operating system,
the more likely it is that independent software vendors will write
programs that run on that operating system, and, in this circular fashion,
the more valuable the operating system will be to consumers.
It is correct that under strongly increasing returns, the tendency of the
market is towards monopoly....
[A]nd it is certainly possible that the monopolization is inefficient.
But notice that most of the steps in the dynamic process leading to
monopoly or imperfect competition are steps in which the growth of the
monopoly arises by offering a cheaper or superior product....
The amici curiae brief notes that, "once a market is 'tipped' in favor
of a particular competitor, it would take truly massive forces to return the
market to a state of equilibrium (i.e., competition)." There are two
remarks to be made here. (1) Clearly, competition is not a state of
equilibrium or at any rate of stable equilibrium .... (2) "Truly massive"
forces are very likely to impose their own truly massive costs, which
have to be weighed against the gain from competition, which, under
increasing returns, is sure to be inefficient, or from "tipping" the
equilibrium in the right direction, which is usually unknowable.
This is not to deny that a firm with a large installed base or other
realization of scale economies may sometimes be in a position to impose
artificial barriers, and these should be regulated or prohibited .... But
interfering with purely natural barriers to entry can be dangerous to the
188
economy's welfare.
As the Arrow declaration makes clear, the phenomenon of scale
economies, or "increasing returns," is central to the Microsoft case.

Professor Arrow suggests that it is important to distinguish the effects of
artificial and natural barriers to entry in an increasing-returns industry. The
natural barriers in the operating system software market are the factors
initially discussed by Arrow: up-front fixed costs and network externalities.
Artificial barriers are alleged as the basis of the complaints against
Microsoft: exclusionary contracts (contracts with computer makers and
188. See Declaration of Kenneth J. Arrow at Part ImE.A-B, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980
F. Supp. 537 (D.D.C. 1997) (No. 94-1564), http:llweb.lawcrawler.comnlmicrosoftlusdoj/Cases/0049.htm
(citation omitted).
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Internet service providers) and product tying (tying the Internet browser to
the operating system).
An additional problem not discussed in Arrow's declaration is the
possibility that some artificial barriers may be socially desirable in an
industry with increasing returns. Suppose, for example, A produces
hairbrushes and combs, and there are scale economies in the joint
production of both. Suppose B produces only combs. If A can fully
exploit scale economies, it can offer a combined package of combs and
brushes more cheaply than can B or any other firm. In this setting, A might
want to offer only the combination package, a move that commonly would
be labeled as product tying, an artificial barrier. Here, that move may be
socially desirable. Why? Tying increases the likelihood that A will be able
to exploit economies of joint production. Some consumers might buy
combs and brushes together even though they would have preferred (ceteris
paribus) to purchase only one or the other, leading to a decrease in
consumer welfare that must be offset against the gain that follows from A's
full exploitation of the economies of joint production. 189 Of course, if B or
some other firm can offer combs at a price consumers find attractive
(enough below the combined price for A's combs and brushes to be worth
forgoing the tied purchase), then A will sell fewer combs and will not fully
exploit the benefits of joint production.
Let us reconsider our error-cost analysis in this context. To this point
we have argued that the general-intent-plus-reasonable-conduct test is
inferior to the specific-intent test because the costs of false convictions are
likely to be relatively high and unconstrained under the general-intent-plusreasonable-conduct test. Does the presence of increasing returns, or natural
barriers to entry, require us to alter this conclusion?
Consider, first, the costs of false acquittals. One should note
immediately that the definition of a false acquittal is more complicated
now. One could argue that a false acquittal occurs whenever a defendant
that has employed artificial entry barriers escapes punishment. This
standard, however, would be inappropriate from the vantage of social
welfare, because it encompasses the case in which the artificial barriers
have a negligible impact (probably less than any cost of policing it).
189.

On the use of tying to capture scale economies, see John L Peteman. The International Salt

Case, 22 J.L. & ECON. 351, 362-64 (1979), which suggests that International Salt's policy of tying salt
to Lixators was efficient in the sense that it allowed the firm to reduce the expnses of distributing salt
through gaining scale economies in distribution. But see Robin Cooper Feldman. Defensive Leveraging
in Antitrust, 87 GEo. LJ. 2079 (1999) (arguing that product tying may frequently be understood as an
attempt to prevent erosion of a monopoly in the primary product).
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Suppose, for example, that both artificial and natural barriers are present,
but that the difficulties experienced by rivals are entirely attributable to the
natural barriers. In this case, the defendant would not be found liable under
a properly functioning reasonable conduct standard, because the critical
requirement of causation is lacking. A verdict for the defendant in these
circumstances should not be deemed a false acquittal. Under a proper
definition of the reasonable conduct standard, a false acquittal occurs only
when the defendant has erected artificial barriers that substantially diminish
market competition.
There is another serious difficulty in applying a reasonable conduct
standard in the increasing-returns environment. As we noted earlier, some
degree of artificial entry protection may be socially desirable when the
dominant firm is attempting to ensure full exploitation of scale economies
in production and marketing. In the software market, recall, there are scale
economies in production and network externalities (a form of scale
economies) in consumption and in complementary product markets
(applications software). The dominant firm may be the only actor in this
market whose gain from exploiting scale economies is sufficiently large to
make it worthwhile to invest the sums necessary to achieve such
economies.
Under a proper reasonable conduct standard, the dominant firm would
not be found liable when the artificial barriers had no significant impact on
market competition, or when the artificial barriers were socially desirable
in light of the gains from exploiting scale economies. A proper standard
would force us to confront the question: How much is too much? In other
words, given that the reasonable conduct standard should make allowance
for the presence of some artificial barriers to entry, in the increasing-returns
context, when has the dominant firm gone too far in creating artificial
barriers? Obviously, this question is hard to answer. That task is at least as
difficult as determining whether, under Hand's Alcoa standard, a dominant
firm has expanded its capacity in a preemptive or in a reasonablefashion.
It should be clear from this discussion that, because of the difficulty in
distinguishing the effects of artificial and natural barriers in the increasingreturns setting, the likelihood of judicial error is substantial under a
reasonable conduct test. Like the question of reasonable conduct in the
medical malpractice setting, or the issue of capacity expansion in Alcoa, the
reasonableness determination in a setting of increasing returns is very
likely to be beyond the competence of a court.
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We can, however, more readily answer other questions. Setting aside
the issue of whether a false acquittal has occurred, can we tell whether the
cost of a false acquittal is likely to be constrained by market pressures in
the increasing-returns setting? We can. Although the threat of entry is
weakened in this setting, it remains a constraining force-it still helps put
an outer limit on the costs of a false acquittal. Suppose artificial barriers
(such as tying) are present and the natural barriers to entry are trivial (that
is, the artificial barriers have bite). This would be the case where, say, the
aspiring entrant can produce at a lower cost than the dominant incumbent,
but the cost of entry is high because of an artificial barrier erected by the
incumbent firm. The threat of entry remains a constraining force in this
setting because the aspiring entrant will incur the additional entry costswill climb the artificial barrier-if the anticipated gains from superior
efficiency would permit it to recoup the costs of entry. The degree of
constraint, of course, depends upon the size of the barrier-if the potential
entrant cannot offer a significant efficiency advantage, there is no evident
1 90
welfare gain from entry or welfare loss from exclusion.
Now let us turn to the costs of false convictions. The relevant
question is whether these costs are unusually high in the increasing-returns
setting. We have identified the general types of false-conviction costs as
follows: primary overdeterrence costs, secondary rent-seeking costs, and
tertiary litigation costs. Primary overdeterrence costs consist generally of
production-efficiency costs, price-efficiency costs, and cartelization costs.
Without introducing a detailed accounting effort, it should be clear that
these costs are larger in the increasing-returns setting than in cases of
decreasing returns or constant returns. In the increasing-returns setting,
any given price increase implies a loss in production efficiency and a
further price-efficiency loss since the cost of producing each additional unit
rises. Cartelization costs are also apt to be larger. This follows from the
tendency toward monopoly noted in the Arrow declaration, which suggests
that the number of firms in the industry will be smaller and the prospects
for formal or informal cartel arrangements greater. 191 In the operatingsystem software market, these costs are present along with the efficiency
190.

This argument puts to one side the prospect of increased "x-inefficiency costs" to nonenuy.

X-inefficiency refers to the theory that when competition is weak, firms will tend to tolerate a greater
degree of incompetence and dilatory behavior from their workers. See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID RoSS.
INDusTRAL
U MRKEr
a
STucruRE AND ECONOMIc PERFORMANcE 667-72 (3d ed. 1990).

191.

As George Stigler noted, the relation of the number of firms in an industry to the degree of

competition in the industry is unproven, but a smaller number of firms reduces the costs of cartelization
(even if it does not reduce-and even if it may increase--die benefits of competition). See Stigler
supra note 129, at 59.
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costs associated with reducing network effects. Output restraints and price
increases in this special case reduce the network benefits to users and to
application makers.
Yet another reason for concern over false convictions is that rentseeking costs are likely to be quite high in the increasing-returns setting.
The reason is simple: Every firm wants to be the winner. Every firm, and
every consumer, benefits ex ante from a regime that encourages full
exploitation of scale economies. However, ex post, after the winner has
emerged, every loser prefers a regime in which he is the winner or in which
the market is shared in an oligopolistic structure. This is true irrespective
of the identities of the losers and the winners. The behavior of Microsoft's
main competitors in the market for potential software platforms does not
reveal any essential quality that distinguishes the officers of those firms
from the officers of Microsoft. Rather, their behavior is the predictable
response of firms that have (at least temporarily) lost the race for
dominance in a market with increasing returns and network effects. For
such firms, there is a nearly irresistible incentive to contest the ultimate
outcome.
The existence of natural barriers explains a large part-if not all- of
the incentive for unsuccessful or nondominant firms to seek a regime in
which the market is more evenly shared. Although there is a tendency
toward monopoly under increasing returns, we often see oligopolistic
markets. For example, although railroads have high fixed costs relative to
most industries, the railroad industry typically is defined by an oligopolistic
structure rather than by a single dominant firm. A sufficient explanation is
that natural-capacity constraints make it difficult for one firm to displace all
of its competitors. The existence of very high fixed and low marginal
costs, however, makes vigorous price competition quite perilous for the
financial health of the firms. 192 There is, hence, a strong incentive to arrive
at an arrangement that will secure for each of the firms a stable existence,
relatively sheltered from fierce competition. 193 These arrangements can
last a long time, but they are unstable in the face of impediments to
verifiable information on competitive conduct. For that reason, the efforts
GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1877-1916, at 8 (1965).
193. This is at least part of the story behind the regulation of railroads. See id. at 7; Robert M.
Spann & Edward W. Erickson, The Economics of Railroading: The Beginning of Cartelization and
Regulation, 1 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Scl. 227 (1970).
192.
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to maintain railroad cartels were no more a feature of the industry than the
94
collapse of the cartel arrangements. 1
Much as it might explain about the structure of a particular increasingreturns industry, the existence of natural barriers will not be the first
explanation offered by less successful competitors for their performance.
Given the difficulty of distinguishing the effects of natural and artificial
barriers, and the desire to gain a market advantage, each nondominant firm
has an incentive to attribute the effects of natural barriers to the existence
of artificial barriers. Indeed, as in the tax-cheating and bribery examples
mentioned previously,19 5 competition should induce every nondominant
firm to mount such a challenge so long as the test applied has a substantial
probability of erroneous application-as is the case with the general-intentplus-reasonable-conduct test in this context.
Finally, it should be clear that the administrative and litigation costs
associated with false convictions are likely to be unusually high in the
increasing returns setting. The reasons follow from the foregoing
arguments. The difficulty of distinguishing the effects of artificial and
natural barriers generates uncertainty, and uncertainty generates
litigation. 9 6 In addition to uncertainty, high stakes increase the prospect
for litigation. 19 7 High stakes are a standard feature of competition in
increasing-returns settings.
Far from seeing increasing returns as a reason for altering the specificintent requirement, we conclude that the case for such a change is
especially weak in the context of increasing returns. As in the general case,
the costs of false acquittals continue to be restrained by competitive forces,
but the costs associated with false convictions are likely to be especially
high in the increasing-returns setting. Contrary to the suggestions of
scholars such as Salop and Romaine, the existence of increasing returns
and network externalities in the operating system software market do not
suggest that a reasonable-conduct-plus-general-intent standard would be
194. See PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE EcoNoMic EFFECrs OF REGULATION: THE TRUNK-LIE
RAiLROAD CARTELS AND THE INTERSTATE COMMtRCE Co.tinssio.l
BE,-oRP 1900 (1965); Elizabeth
Granitz & Benjamin Klein, Monopolization by "Raising Rivals' Costs": The StandardOil Case, 39 J.L
& ECON. 1 (1996).
195. See discussion supra text accompanying note 145.
196. See. e.g., POSNEP, supra note 82, at 588-90.
197. If the stakes are high, then the plaintiff's expected recovery is more likely to exceed the
plaintiff's litigation expenses, so the plaintiff is more likely to sue. Moreover, if the plaintiff and the
defendant disagree about the likely outcome of a trial, the likelihood of settlement declines as the stakes

increase. These points are clear implications of the settlement model elaborated in Shavell. supra note
101.
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preferable in Microsoft and similar high-technology antitrust cases. To the
contrary, they suggest that the specific-intent test is strongly preferable.
C. SPECIFIC INTENT, SUBJECTIVELY ASSESSED

At this point, we can quickly dispose of the alternative standard
recently urged by Frank Fisher that would determine liability on the basis
of subjective-intent evidence. The subjective-intent test divides the market
between firms that are legally sophisticated (or especially focused on
litigation rather than market competition) and unsophisticated firms (or
firms preoccupied with market competition and largely oblivious to the
importance of litigation as a strategic tool). Legally sophisticated firms
know how to avoid leaving substantial amounts of discoverable evidence of
subjective intent. Unsophisticated firms are not aware of the importance of
watching their words. The subjective-intent test, thus, introduces a large
payoff for legal sophistication, or more generally, strategic sophistication in
a litigious environment.
The ultimate effect of the subjective-intent test on plaintiffs' and
defendants' success rates is not readily estimated. Potential plaintiffs might
be worse off under the subjective-intent test, since firms eventually would
gain the sophistication to avoid liability. Of course, it is unlikely that every
firm would gain such a level of sophistication. At the same time,
subjective intent to harm competition would be apt, in many instances, to
be predicated on internal documents that (as explained earlier) are far from
compelling. This, however, is likely to be the direct evidence of subjective
intent that is available. 9 ' As firms grow more sophisticated, plaintiffs
would respond accordingly, arguing for a finding of specific intent at the
first whiff, or slightest suggestion, of bad intent. The game, in other words,
is unpredictable, and the expected strategic responses are most likely to
push toward reliance on increasingly ambiguous evidence.
Although we cannot confidently predict the equilibrium of this game,
our first intuition is that the subjective-intent test increases the risk of
liability for firms operating under it. Under this assumption, the social
198. Recognizing the importance of business records, Judge Frank Easterbrook criticized the
subjective-intent approach for its meager contribution to judicial accuracy and its large impact on
litigation expenses:
Intent does not help to separate competition from attempted monopolization and invites juries
to penalize hard competition. It also complicates litigation. Lawyers rummage through
business records seeking to discover tidbits that will sound impressive (or aggressive) when
read to a jury. Traipsing through the warehouses of business in search of misleading evidence
both increases the cost of litigation and reduces the accuracy of decisions.
A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1989).
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costs associated with the subjective-intent standard are likely to be
equivalent to and perhaps larger than those associated with a general-intent
test. The reason is that the subjective-intent test would operate effectively
as a strict liability standard, since every act that could be deemed
anticompetitive, whether or not it would be deemed so under a reasonable
conduct standard, could lead to a finding of liability under the Sherman
Act.
The precise manner in which the social costs of a subjective-intent test
are realized might depend on the type of defendant. Among legally
unsophisticated potential defendants, false convictions probably would
happen more frequently under the subjective-intent test than under the
general-intent test. 199

For legally sophisticated

defendants,

false

convictions might happen less frequently, but only because they consulted
their lawyers before taking any action potentially harmful to competitors.
Both types of equilibrium imply large social costs. In the former, involving
the unsophisticated firms, the costs of false convictions would be large. In
the latter, involving sophisticated firms, the overdeterrence costs would be
unusually large, not to mention the sheer administrative burden of having
lawyers involved in the formulation and negotiation of every competitive
action. The two outcomes differ largely in the sense that the rent-seeking
and litigation costs are likely to be smaller in the equilibrium among
sophisticated firms. But the savings in these costs would probably be more
than offset by greater overdeterrence costs.
Whether realized in the form of primary (overdeterrence), secondary
(rent-seeking), or tertiary (litigation) costs, we see no reason a priori to
believe that the social costs created by the subjective-intent test are less
than those of the general-intent test. We have argued already that these
components of social cost are amplified in the increasing-returns setting
characteristic of network markets. The presence of network externalities
tilts the case against rather than in favor of the subjective-intent test.
V. EXTENSIONS
The same sorts of judgments about error costs we observe in antitrust
can explain the shape of many legal rules. In this section, we provide a few
199. Would false acquittals occur more frequently? Probably not. The subjective-intent test
would most likely take the form of an "add on," leading to liability in those cases %%herethe conduct
was ambiguous but the subjective bad intent was present. In a case where the defendant's conluct is

unambiguously unreasonable, the court is unlikely to allow the defendant to escape liability merely
because of benign intent.
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illustrations. These are not developed in great detail, but they indicate the
manner in which error-cost analysis can illuminate the choices made in
framing legal rules.

A. BusINEsS JUDGMENT RULE OF CORPORATE LAW
Error-cost analysis provides a theory of the business judgment rule in
corporate law. Under the business judgment rule, courts defer to the
judgment of the corporate officers when shareholders or creditors sue them
on the theory that they were negligent in managing the firm. In order to
hold officers liable for negligence under the rule, plaintiffs typically have
to prove that the officer's harm to the corporation was grossly negligent or
intentional. The business judgment rule is operationally quite similar to the
section 2 legal standard in the sense that it can be read as a reasonable
conduct rule requiring evidence of specific intent.
Since courts have no particular advantage in reviewing the business
decisions of corporate officers, one should assume that a reasonable
conduct rule with a general-intent test would result in frequent errors in
favor of both plaintiffs and defendants. The likely result of these errors is
overdeterrence, since corporate officers would be reluctant to take actions
that might be near the threshold of reasonable conduct.
False acquittals occur when the corporate officer is found nonnegligent even though the expected harms to the corporation exceeded the
expected benefits of his conduct. However, the costs of false acquittals for
negligent management will be constrained by market forces. Managers
who in good faith frequently take actions that harm their corporations are
likely to be punished in several ways. They will lose their jobs, their
reputations will suffer, or the corporations they manage will fail. In a
competitive market for corporate control, bad managers will be forced to
exit or consistently to receive a return on their human capital investments
well below what they could receive in an alternative calling.
False-conviction costs for negligent management obviously create
excessive deterrence against risk-taking by managers. More important,
false convictions generate a form of rent-seeking behavior as well. The
parties who own the assets of a corporation can be divided into fixed
claimants and residual claimants; the former is composed of fixed-salary
employees and creditors, and the latter is composed primarily of
shareholders. Often these two classes of owner have opposing views on the
appropriateness of risk taking. Fixed claimants usually prefer the firm to
follow conservative policies, while shareholders are willing to see the firm
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take risky decisions. A false-convictions regime could generate a rentdissipating struggle between these classes of owner to gain control of
corporate officers. Since corporate officers already owe their primary duty
to the shareholders, the fixed claimants would have the clearest incentive to
use the courts to gain control over corporate decisions.

B. SPECIFIC INTENT AND DUTY IN TORT LAW
While antitrust rules and corporate law rules affect rents over which
parties compete to gain control, there are many kinds of rules that can be
explained by an error-cost analysis that do not control the distribution of
rents. Tort law contains many such rules, almost all of which come in the
form of modifications of the reasonable conduct standard.
As we have suggested earlier, specific-intent requirements in the rules
for assault and defamation can be analyzed from an error-cost perspective.
In both cases, error-free courts could, in theory, apply a reasonable conduct
standard in a manner that penalizes all socially undesirable conduct.
However, the difficulty arises in these cases of determining the reasonable
conduct threshold.
One reason for the difficulty is reluctance to restrict socially beneficial
activity. Expression, which is directly at issue in defamation and can be
implicated in assault cases as well, has long been understood to have
aspects of a public good.200 So, too, elements of assault are not readily
disentangled from socially beneficial interpersonal relations (including, at
times, an element of expressive activity). 20 1
Given the difficulty of determining the reasonable conduct threshold
for assault and defamation, the specific-intent test serves the function of
providing an alternative standard that provides the right incentives for
courts. Courts are required under these standards to penalize conduct that
may be largely expressive only when the evidence indicates that the actor
intended to harm someone. Cases of mixed motives, determined under an
200. See, e.g., JosEPH HAMBURGER, JOHN STUART MtLL ON LIBERTY AND CONTROL (1999);
FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982); Aaron Director. The Pariiy
of the Economic Market Place, 7 J.L & ECON. 1, 3-10 (1964); Richard A. Pomer, Free Speech in an
Economic Perspective,20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 41-43 (1986).

201. Return to the example of Tuberville v. Savage, discussed supra note I 11. Or considzr the
more extreme example of a feigned assassination attempt. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct,
Caste, 60 U. CH. L. REv. 795, 836 (1993) (observing that "an attempted assassination of the Presidznt
may well qualify as speech," while also noting that "[ilt does not raise anything like a srious free
speech question... because government can invoke strong content-neutral reasons for protecting the
President's life").
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objective test, are inappropriate for penalization under the rules in these
areas. This approach minimizes the presumably large costs associated with
false convictions for expression.
An error-cost perspective also suggests a positive theory of the famous
and often-criticized "no duty" rules in tort law, such as the rule governing
rescue and that governing the duties of a landowner to a trespasser. Under
the rescue rule, an individual is generally immune from tort liability for
simply declining to rescue someone, even though the burden of rescue is
minimal. However, a defendant may be held liable if he intentionally
harms the victim or acts with reckless disregard for the victim's safety.
The same rule applies as between a landowner and trespasser. Both rules
effectively substitute a specific-intent rule for the negligence test.
Many scholars have noted that a duty to rescue would create serious
line-drawing problems for courts because it would often be difficult to
determine which of several parties should be held responsible for failing to
rescue. °2 Tort law generally assigns duties of care for activities that create
foreseeable harm. 20 3 A general duty to rescue, on the other hand, could not
be appended to a specific activity or a specific decision. The range of
potential defendants and the difficulties of assessing the value of the
targeted (nonrescuing) action as compared to its risk of harm pose
enormous problems for structuring a rule with low error costs. Those who
are not rescued (or their survivors) are unlikely to have information about
most of the potential rescuers, and courts are unlikely to be able to secure
enough of the private information about the activities of nonrescuers to
assess correctly the reasonableness of the decision not to rescue. The rule,
thus, would be almost certain to be enforced selectively and with a
considerable degree of error. Moreover, the rule is apt to generate
considerable administrative costs unless it is structured to minimize the
prospect that false convictions would advantage risk-taking activities by
potential plaintiffs.2 °4
202. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, § 56, at 373-85; James A Henderson, Jr., Process
Constraintsin Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 928-43 (1982).
203. For the best-known presentation of this view, see Chief Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf
v. Long Island RailroadCo., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
204. And if the rule advantages risk-taking by potential plaintiffs, it will generate incentives
among those plaintiffs to litigate to maintain the advantage. Thus, a duty to rescue could generate the
same rent-seeking incentives as a nuisance rule protecting landowners from aesthetic disturbances. See
supra text accompanying note 114.
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C. INTENT IN CONsTIruTIONAL LAW

Constitutional law presents issues of intent analysis in several areas.
Consider the construction of the Bill of Attainder Clause, 205 the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment,2 0 6 and the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 7 These provisions, respectively, prohibit
government actions that single out specific individuals for punishment, that
discriminate against suspect classes, and that discriminate unreasonably

against disfavored speech.208 In each case, the constitutional concern is not

readily addressed by looking only at the express language of a statute or at
its effects. And in each case, the courts have fashioned specific-intent tests
to effectuate the constitutional interest.
The starting point in each provision is the instinct that government
officers cannot be trusted to serve public interests in certain settings where
their personal interests are engaged directly or where animus from a

politically influential group distorts public action. 209 Of course, personal

interest and group conflict are endemic to public governance2 3 0
Constitutional processes are designed to limit the degree to which these
205.
206.

See, e.g., Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,473,475-76,478 1977).
See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575. 592

(1983).

207. See, e.g., Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 US. 256,279 (1979).
208. As we explain below, the "reasonableness" determination in First Amcndnmnt law is not a
simple, undifferentiated assessment of reasonableness. Rather, the courts have created per se rules
(usually with exceptions) for some types of speech-regulative activity and have utilized a modified
reasonableness standard for other types (with burdens on the government in some cases to justify the
reasonableness of its actions and burdens on plaintiffs in other cases to establish the unreasonableness
of speech regulations). See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: Constitutional
Interpretationand Negative FirstAmendment Theory, 34 UCLA L REV. 1405 (1987); John Hart Ely,
Flag Desecration:A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment
Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, PracticalReason and
the FirstAmendment, 34 UCLA L REv. 1615 (1987); Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First
Amendment. A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content
Regulation and the FirstAmendment,25 WM. & MARY L REV. 189(1983). Similarly, equal protection
analysis has fragmented into different tests for different contexts. See. e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S.
429, 432-33 (1983) (strict scrutiny standard of review for race-based classifications)- Craig v. Boron.

429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (intermediate standard of review for gender-based classifications); Mass. Bd.
of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (rationality test for nonsuspect classifications).
209. See, e.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867); LEE C. BOLINGER, THE
TOLERANT SoCiETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH INAMERICA (19861; JOtN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRusr. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Vincent Blasi, Tte

Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 A.M. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521; Ronald A. Cass,
CommercialSpeech, Constitutionalisnm Collective Choice, 56 U. CIN. L REV. 1317 (19881. Frederick
Schauer, The Role of the People in FirstAmendmtent Theoty, 74 CAL L REV. 761 (1986).
210. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DE.MOCRATIC THEORY (1956); TmtEODOE Low I.
THE END OFLIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTiORITY (1969).
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distortions from public interest place exceptional burdens on individuals in
government.
The three provisions discussed here reflect intuitive concerns,
probably shared by the Constitution's framers, that particular actions would
be unlikely to be policed effectively by ordinary political processes, would
impose especially corrosive burdens on individuals, and could be addressed
at tolerable cost by a focused prohibition.21 1 These provisions are part of
an overall design to align government actions with public interest. The
shape given to these provisions through constitutional interpretation is
sensitive to error-cost concerns.
More specifically, in each of the three cases considered below, courts
have imposed a specific-intent burden on plaintiffs who challenge facially
neutral statutes or regulations. In an ideal, error-free world, there would be
no need to examine intent. Courts could apply a reasonableness test to
individual conduct and to legislation as well. Under such a test, applied to
legislation, judges would have a power quite similar to that claimed by
Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull:212 to invalidate legislation as inconsistent
213
with "natural law."
In the real world, however, such an amorphous test would create
substantial costs. Assessing legislation on general reasonableness grounds
is probably beyond the competence of most judges, who could not possibly
find the time to understand all of the tradeoffs inherent in a particular
statute. Burdened parties, observing the cloud of uncertainty surrounding
every legislative enactment, would have incentives to challenge every
statute. In view of the likelihood of error and attendant costs, the
constitutional doctrines considered below fall easily in line with the errorcost framework.
211. Cf. DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST, at 44 (1984) (discussing
THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) and limitations on legislative power such as bills of
attainder, stating that "Hamilton [understood] a limited Constitution to be one with 'certain specified
exceptions to the legislative authority'-rather than as one limited to a certain specified enumeration of
the legislative authority."). The view expressed by Epstein is consistent with the notion that the three
constitutional provisions discussed here make surgical strikes at legislative authority at points where it
is especially likely to depart from general welfare interests.
212. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
213. Justice Chase argued that "natural law," in addition to the provisions of written constitutions,
constrained the power of governments (state and federal). Id. at 386-88. A regime in which courts are
free to invalidate legislation on the basis of natural law theories would not differ greatly, if at all,
from
one in which courts apply a reasonableness test to legislation.
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1. Bills ofAttainder
The general requirements of the Constitution are that punishment not
be imposed retroactively, 214 that the grounds for punishment be clearly
articulated,2 15 that persons independent of the legislative and executive
2 16
branches determine whether the grounds for punishment are established,
and that the manner in which punishment is determined comport with
norms of due process (norms consonant with accurate decisionmaking). 217
Each of these restrictions on criminal punishment is designed to increase
the probability that punishment will serve public interests.
Direct imposition of punishment on individuals by the legislature-a
bill of attainder 2 1 -is suspect because it is more likely to be subject to
manipulation in ways at odds with public interest, in no small measure
because the certainty of the enforcement target dramatically increases the
risk of opportunistic behavior. 219 This is true not only of the immediate
term, but of the longer term as well. For instance, the narrow interest of a
temporary legislative majority might be advanced by punishing political
adversaries; lodging such a power in the legislature could undermine
processes that ordinarily would keep political power from becoming
concentrated.
The seriousness of the concern, however, does not make it easy to
determine when it is triggered. It is not enough that legislation has a
pronounced effect on a particular group or even a particular individual.
The narrowness of the class punished does not itself demonstrate that the
concerns behind the Bill of Attainder Clause are engaged. Indeed, even
legislation that singles out an individual-as happened when ownership
rights of certain presidential papers were assigned to Richard Nixon by
law-can be free from the sort of self-interest or group animus that
214.
215.
216.

See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, ci. 3.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONsT. amend. XqV. § 1.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cL 3.

217.

See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.

218. Historically, a bill of attainderw-as the legislative direction of capital punishment for select
individuals. Other legislative punishments directed at particular individuals were bills of pain and
punishment. The constitutional provision, however, long has been interpreted to cover both sorts of
punishment. See JOHN E. NoWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTmmONAI. LAw § 11.9(c). at 464-

65 (6th ed. 2000).
219. This follows from and is the obverse of the intuition that individuals with limited knoledge
of their particular attributes will arrive at more just rules for their own governance. See GEOFMEY
BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF RULES: CONST[ToONAM. POImICAL EcoNoMY

22-29 (1985).
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threatens serious distortion of public processes. 220 Conversely, legislation
that on its face names no specific person nonetheless may be tailored to
impose a criminal punishment on particular individuals who are targeted
because of1 past actions and have little opportunity to avoid such
22
penalties.
Absent a ready metric to ascertain the propriety of a given legislative
burden, courts might want to determine whether the law is animated by licit
222
or illicit considerations-put another way, by a specific intent to harm.
This is, in fact, the approach used in assessing transgressions of the Bill of
Attainder Clause. 223 The alternative to an intent inquiry, a reasonableness
test, could easily be beyond the competence of courts and would surely
encourage challenges to every piece of legislation. Courts, however, do not
inquire into legislators' subjective intent-that inquiry would depend on
private information that is difficult to obtain in a reliable manner. Instead,
the courts look at factors that would be congruent with illicit motive rather
than seeking directly to identify legislators' intent from their own
statements or from similar evidence that is highly manipulable.
The courts' construction of the Bill of Attainder Clause, thus, appears
consistent with the error-cost analysis presented in this Article. The
specific-intent feature of the clause's construction helps reduce errors and
uncertainty that would exist if courts had the discretion afforded by a
reasonableness standard. And the use of an objective test for specific intent
avoids error costs (including administrative costs) connected to a
subjective-intent inquiry.
2. Equal Protection
Equal protection analysis has evolved in a similar direction, though
with more controversy. The language of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is simple, but its instruction that no person be
denied "equal protection of the laws" 224 cannot be implemented without
substantial analytical work. Perhaps the clause's lynchpin notion of
"equality" is not completely empty, as Peter Westen has urged. 225 But
220. See Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,471-73 (1977).
221. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,461-62 (1965).
222. Dean Paul Brest has proposed a more general focus on this issue in order to determine when
unconstitutional discrimination has occurred. Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the
Problem of UnconstitutionalLegislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95.
223. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 468-84 (1977).
224. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
225. See Peter westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982). See also
Kenneth W. Simons, Equality as a ComparativeRight, 65 B.U. L. REV. 387 (1985).
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Westen is plainly correct that the notion of equality becomes meaningful
only after we specify what the relevant criteria are for making distinctions,

specification that requires a theoretical grounding in something other than
the notion of likeness.
Rather than focusing on equality, the courts have followed a different
route to interpreting the Equal Protection Clause. First, they have
identified characteristics that seem especially likely to be subjects of

animus among government decisionmakers 2 6 and that seem least likely to
correlate with any legitimate basis for distinction among those benefited or

burdened by government actions. Race is the first characteristic on this list,

but national origin, sex, and other characteristics also are viewed as suspect
bases for distinguishing among citizens.227 These distinctions are not
indefensible in all cases, but they are sufficiently unlikely to serve public
interest that they bear special burdens of justification.228 Under strict

as serving a
scrutiny analysis, even discrimination that can be defended
22 9
legitimate public purpose generally will be found wanting.

Second, the courts have imposed a specific-intent requirement in cases

in which facially neutral acts are asserted to discriminate among certain
groups and for discrimination along quasi-suspect lines (such as
residency), 30 Commentators have suggested various tests for judging the
consistency of facially neutral legislation with equal protection. Some have
226. United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973) (i"lf the
constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least
mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimategovernmental interest.").
227. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN F. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITTIONAL L W § 18.3,
at 216-21 (3d ed. 1999).
228. As a formal matter, the Equal Protection clause provides merely for a greater or lesser degree
of scrutiny of the government's justification for discrimination that is built into the law. The higher
level of scrutiny is triggered by a "suspect classification" or by a government action that burdens a
"fundamental right." United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). In practice,
however, the Court seems to use more stringent tests for race than for national origin, for national origin
than for sex, and so on. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 227, § 18.3. at 222-26. John Marquez
Lundin, Making Equal ProtectionAnalysis Make Sense, 49 SYRACUSE L REV. 1191, 1193 (1999)
("[W]hile laws based on alienage are ostensibly subject to strict scrutiny just like race-based action, in
practice, the Court routinely upholds immigration laws that make a mockery of the Due Process
Clause.").
229. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
230. Residency requirements assertedly burden a right to interstate travel. Although that right
does not appear in the Constitution and has not been found to be among the fundamental rights, burdens
upon which require strict scrutiny, the courts have been unvilling to give residency requirements highly
deferential review. See, e.g., Hooper v. Bemadillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612. 623 (1985); Zobel
v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1982).
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urged analysis only of the effects of legislation, with "disparate impact" on
classes divided along suspect lines sufficient to invalidate a law.23 This is

equivalent to applying a general-intent test. Some commentators have
argued that courts should strike down legislation if they determine that the

legislation was in fact motivated by animus along suspect lines, applying a
subjective-intent test.2 32 Some commentators have urged courts to ignore
the purpose behind legislation, upholding any legislation that has a
plausible, neutral justification for the law, applying a weak specific-intent
23 3

test.

The courts have not followed any of these paths, instead applying a
strong or credible objective specific-intent standard. Courts, thus, will
strike down laws that, even though supported by a rational connection to a
legitimate government purpose, seem weakly connected to that purpose and

closely connected to the sort of animus that prompts equal protection

concerns. 234 But they will uphold against equal protection challenges laws
that pass modest rational basis review in the absence of a showing that
235
illicit animus is the likely motivation of the law.
Although criticized from many different directions, this approach is
entirely consistent with the error-cost framework developed here. The
general-intent approach would be widely overinclusive, generating many
false convictions, occasionally underinclusive, and impose enormous costs
associated with uncertainty and with administrative costs. If any benefit or
burden along suspect lines suffices to invalidate legislation, virtually all
actions are open to challenge, with a large attendant cost from strategic

litigation.
231.
See, e.g., Gayle Binion, "Intent" and Equal Protection:A Reconsideration, 1983 Sup. CT.
REv. 397; Theodore Eisenberg, DisproportionateImpact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional
Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36 (1977); Charles R. Lawrence UM,The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection:Reckoning with UnconsciousRacism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
232. See, e.g., Brest, supranote 222, at 130-31. Thus, if racial animus motivated a law, the law
would be judged as discrimination along racial lines that could be upheld if it were essential to serve a
compelling state interest (a virtual impossibility if motivated by animus). See Ashutosh Bhagwat,
Purpose Scrutiny in ConstitutionalAnalysis,85 CAL. L. REv. 297 (1997) (urging both a more vigorous
purpose review in many instances and a more deferential review in other cases).
233. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 209, at 136-45; Robert W. Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in
ConstitutionalLaw: Judicial Review and DemocraticTheory, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1049 (1979).
234. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down an amendment to the
Colorado constitution that prohibited legal protection of homosexuals); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55
(1982) (holding unconstitutional an Alaska statute conditioning mineral dividend distributions on length
of residency in the state); Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (invalidating "unrelated
person" provision that denied food stamp benefits to certain households).
235. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (disallowing equal protection
claims based on disparate impact theory).
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The subjective-intent approach also is inconsistent with the error-cost
framework. Because of the difficulty of determining subjective intent,
uncertainty surrounding the validity of legislation would be at least as great
under the subjective-intent test as under the general-intent test. The social
costs associated with a subjective-intent test should be of the same
magnitude as those associated with the general-intent test. Recognizing the
uncertainty problem, the Supreme Court flatly rejected the subjective-intent
2 36
test in Pahnerv. Thompson:
[l]t is extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation, or
collection of different motivations, that lie behind a legislative
enactment. ...[Tihere is an element of futility in a judicial attempt to
invalidate a law because of the bad motives of its supporters. If the law
is struck down for this reason, rather than because of its facial content or
effect, it would presumably be valid as soon as the
legislature or relevant
37
governing body repassed it for different reasons.
The weak specific-intent approach is more consistent with the errorcost framework and with the law, but it contains too high a risk of false
negatives. Discriminatory actions motivated by racial animus or other
illegitimate purpose often can be camouflaged by somewhat plausible
justifications. If courts were to demand nothing more than a reasonable
justification for government actions, virtually no action would be found to
violate the equal protection guarantee, no matter how malevolent in
purpose and effect.
By adopting a strong specific-intent test that seeks to establish an
inference of specific intent based on evidence, not on the ex-post
rationalizations of litigants, courts have marked out the path that is most
consistent with the error-cost model of this Article. The courts have not
been bogged down in analysis of legislative effects, even where there is no
realistic claim that legislation was the product of animus, nor have they
been bogged down in analysis of specific individual government actors'
motivations. And they have not allowed a specious explanation to
exculpate when government actions are more likely to be understood as
products of illicit animus than of other purposes.
3. FirstAmendment Speech Protection
Another field of constitutional law in which the courts have applied a
specific-intent requirement is First Amendment protection of speech rights.
236.
237.

403 U.S. 217 (1971).
ld. at 224-25.
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The First Amendment's free speech guarantee is one of the Constitution's
most opaque provisions. History suggests that it had an extremely limited
focus, though we are well beyond that.23 Certainly, we are well beyond
the text. The commitment that "Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom of speech"2'39 does not apply merely to Congress, nor to law24
making, nor even to activity that most citizens would describe as speech. 1
What has emerged from judicial construction of the Freedom of
Speech Clause over the past century is a focus on special sources of
distrust.24 The courts have been wary of government speech regulation
that is especially apt to be the product of self-interest-as where the speech
is directly critical of the speech-regulating official or of a superior officer-

or that is especially apt to be the product of animus. 242 The more tolerant

treatment of commercial speech 243 and of "time, place, and manner"

regulation 24 along with the more stringent requirements for messagespecific speech restraints24 5 reflect this approach.246
These divisions are sensitive to the likely error costs of judicial

policing of speech regulation, which necessarily includes attention to the
error costs attending regulation itself.247 The courts have not assessed the

reasonableness of regulation standing alone, an approach that would
generate high error and administrative costs. The approach they have

followed looks very much like an objective specific-intent approach, where
indicia of regulation that correlate with a significant risk of illicit intent, in
238. See Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundationsand Limits of
Freedom of Expression,78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1291 (1998).
239. U.S. CONST. amend I.
240. See, e.g., Schauer, supranote 208, at 267-82.
241. See Blasi, supra note 209 (discussing the checking function that free expression performs
against the abuse of official power); Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice
and the First Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REv 554, 562-64 (1991) (discussing the general incentives
that politicians have to suppress adverse speech); Frederick Schauer, The Second.Best First
Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 8-10 (1989) (discussing popular sovereignty as a motivation
for protecting individual speech from government suppression).
242. See Blasi, supra note 209, at 567-69; Cass, supra note 208, at 1454-56.
243. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764
(1976).
244. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,798 (1989).
245. See, e.g., Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258-59 (1937); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 661 (1925); Stone, supra note 208 at 196-97. The concern extends to forms of regulation that are
readily administered as message regulation as well as to forms that expressly target particular messages.
See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971).
246. See Cass, supra note 208, at 1465-68; Farber & Frickey, supra note 208, at 1622-23; Stone,
supra note 208, at 227-33.
247. See Cass, supra note 209, at 1361-81.
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circumstances in which error costs associated with the speech regulation
will be high, very substantially increase the burden on the government to
justify the regulation. 24
VI. CONCLUSION
Intent has been a controversial issue in the law, particularly in
antitrust. The error-cost theory of legal standards set out in this Article
explains and justifies the role of intent analysis in antitrust and in other
areas of the law. The structure of intent rules can be understood by
focusing on the goal of minimizing the total cost of legal error, which is
determined by the frequencies and costs of false acquittals and false
convictions and the administrative costs associated with making the
requisite decisions. As a general rule, proof of specific intent-an intent to
engage in conduct that violates the law for a particular (bad) reason or with
a particular understanding of its harmful effect-is required where the costs
of false convictions are high relative to those of false acquittals. This errorcost approach explains the allocation of burdens and the sorts of proof
required under the specific-intent tests in antitrust and in many other areas
of law as well.
248. It is important to emphasize that the test here is not simply one of intenL See. e.g.. Posner.
supra note 200. There is no evidence that speech regulation more frequently and systematically dparts
from social-welfare optimization where commercial speech is regulated, for example, than %herc
political speech is regulated. Regulation of commercial speech, however, is likely to impose lower
error costs, both because the process costs of verifying truth are lower in this context and bemuse the
speech, responsive to profit incentives, is apt to be more resistant to regulation than the broad run of

political speech. See Cass, supra note 209, at 1361-81.
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